For refugees and asylum seekers in the UK, being offline is not an inconvenience — it is a structural barrier to rights, healthcare, employment, and survival.

One minute, you have a home, a community, and a daily routine you know by heart. Next thing you know, you are somewhere entirely new, surrounded by strangers, grappling with systems, services, and technology that seem designed for people who already “belong.”

For many refugees and asylum seekers in the UK, digital inclusion is not a luxury, it is essential for survival, legal processes, and social integration. From job applications to healthcare appointments, Wi-Fi access and digital literacy can shape whether an asylum seeker is isolated or empowered in a new country.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) defines digital inclusion as equal, meaningful, and safe access to digital technologies and opportunities, ensuring that vulnerable and marginalized groups are not left behind [16]. Through its Digital Inclusion initiative, UNHCR promotes the inclusion of displaced populations in digital frameworks, ensuring legal access to SIM cards, financial services, data protection, and civic participation [16]. The UN recognizes that the digital divide amplifies existing social, economic, and cultural inequalities such as gender, age, race, income and ability for groups. They specifically acknowledge refugees and persons on the move as being parts of these groups that often face additional structural barriers to accessing digital technologies and services [15]. Consequently, this initiative indicates that digital access is not only about convenience, but it is also a prerequisite for exercising fundamental rights.

Within the UK, these concerns about digital exclusion have begun to shape policy discussions. For instance, the UK published their first steps for their Digital Inclusion Action Plan in 2025, which identifies five priority groups: (1) low-income households, (2) older people, (3) disabled people, (4) people currently out of work, and (5) young people [5]. Subsequent consultation responses highlighted additional groups experiencing distinct barriers to digital inclusion, including refugees and asylum seekers as they noted that these groups may encounter challenges such as language barriers, limited awareness of available resources, and inadequate digital skills or support [6]. At present, however, no updated iteration has yet incorporated these additional populations as standalone categories. As a result, refugees and asylum seekers remain implicitly captured within broader classifications such as “low-income households” or “people currently out of work,” which risks obscuring the distinct structural barriers faced by displaced populations.

This report explores how refugees and asylum seekers experience digital exclusion differently than host communities, the consequences for employment, health, and social life, and lessons for policy. By centering personal narratives first, we aim to highlight the human realities and illuminate strategies for more inclusive digital frameworks.

Refugees and Asylum Seekers as Structurally Distinct

Legal and Administrative Challenges

For many refugees and asylum seekers, digital exclusion is procedural and rights-based. Access to online systems is critical for navigating immigration status, scheduling appointments with the Home Office, receiving updates, submitting asylum applications, or accessing legal documents, such as eVisas [14]. Without stable internet or functional devices, asylum seekers may miss deadlines, fail to submit required forms, or struggle to access health and social services.

Digital inclusion strategies for refugees and asylum seekers must explicitly frame connectivity as providing legal and administrative participation. This could be accomplished through subsidized devices, guaranteed access to public Wi-Fi, and guidance on using government portals safely.

Extreme Income Constraints

When Juhur ran out of mobile data, he relied on public libraries, where Wi-Fi and computer access were strictly time-limited [20]. These constraints were compounded by structural financial barriers. People seeking asylum receive support through the Asylum Support Enablement (ASPEN) card, which can be used for in-store purchases and ATM withdrawals but not for online transactions or recurring contract payments [20]. As a result, asylum seekers are prevented from opening contracts or SIM-only plans, forcing reliance on expensive pay-as-you-go data [20].

As Juhur explained [20]:

“The library computer here [Huddersfield] is one hour. In Sheffield is two hours and most of the time I don’t have data. I don’t have enough data. I only use £10 a month for my phone so I only have 5GB of data. That’s not enough. I just Google things, I can’t use Skype or video.”

State-provided asylum support rates are fixed and fall well below UK poverty thresholds [20]. For individuals restricted from supplementing their income through employment, even small data packages can sometimes amount to around 10 percent of their weekly asylum support payment [20]. Unlike other low-income groups, asylum seekers cannot legally increase their income to offset these costs [13].This creates a structural form of exclusion as limited connectivity directly affects their ability to apply for jobs, maintain social ties, access healthcare, and integrate into society.

Affordability programmes must therefore account for fixed allowances and systemic restrictions. Policy responses could include subsidized mobile data packages, zero-rated access to essential government services, and device-lending schemes that do not require formal bank accounts or long-term addresses.

Language, Literacy, and Platform Navigation

“My laptop helps me with English language, 90% of my search is about English language because I need to improve my English. I speak much better now, it’s not perfect now but much better than it was before. I have done a lot of search about British Values, about democracy and individual liberty. I read a lot of topics and translate to my language to better understand [18].”

While access to devices such as laptops can play a critical role in supporting language acquisition and enabling refugees to engage with social and civic concepts, this process often relies heavily on translation tools. Although translation helps bridge immediate comprehension gaps, it can create challenges when accessing digital services that may not be available in multiple languages or require a level of English proficiency to navigate accurately.

Low English literacy intersects with unfamiliarity with UK institutions and fear of making mistakes in digital applications [2]. For many refugees and asylum seekers, online platforms are not intuitive, requiring users to navigate multiple systems, translate content, and learn new bureaucratic procedures simultaneously [7]. This demonstrates how literacy, digital skills, and procedural knowledge are deeply intertwined, and missteps can carry real consequences, such as delayed asylum decisions and missed healthcare appointments.

Consequently, digital literacy programmes must be multilingual and culturally contextualised, while digital public services should reduce overreliance on translation by improving the accessibility and language inclusivity.

Surveillance, Trust, and Data Fear

For some, using online government services provokes mistrust rather than confidence [2].

“Online things tend to make me sceptical, and I believe that confidentiality and trust issues arise because I don’t know who I am speaking to. Most of the time you end up dealing with untrained receptionists who always ask to call back when they list all your personal issues, which should be kept between you and the doctor or nurse. ”

Experiences of surveillance, both in their countries of origin and within asylum systems, shape reluctance to share personal information [2]. Digital exclusion may be by choice in this case as a protective strategy. Therefore, trust is essential. Digital strategies must ensure clear, accessible information on data handling, privacy protections, and safe engagement with digital systems. Collaboration with NGOs and refugee organizations can help build confidence in online tools [11, 20].

Temporality and Mobility

Refugees and asylum seekers often face rapid relocation between accommodations, disrupting continuity of digital access [20, 18].

Location-based approaches, such as community hubs or local digital inclusion centers, work for residents with stable addresses, but fail when populations are mobile. Displaced people may lose access to broadband subscriptions, device lending programs, and community networks every time they move.

As a result, digital inclusion for refugees and asylum seekers must be portable and flexible to follow the user across locations. Policy frameworks built around static, local access points inadvertently exclude mobile populations. For these reasons, it is important to expand portable community hubs, ensure broadband continuity, and develop device-lending or mobile data programs that travel with displaced populations.

Lived Experiences: Employment, Health, and Social Life

Employment Access

“I had to borrow a laptop from other residents to do my work… If I had a laptop, I could study, do online courses, apply for jobs, research, and complete my CV [10].”

For many refugees and asylum seekers, digital access is central to finding and maintaining employment. Job applications, CV creation, online courses, and employer communications all require reliable devices and connectivity. Without a laptop or stable internet, individuals face structural barriers to economic participation. Libraries and community centers become essential lifelines, but access is limited, crowded, and often only available during standard hours. While the Home Office, the UK’s government department that manages immigration [9], maintains that refugees and asylum seekers can use public libraries for internet access, national spending cuts have led to widespread library closures and reduced local services, undermining this assumption in practice [20].

Looking ahead, as of 2024, 60% of businesses expect growing reliance on advanced digital skills over the next five years, making online access even more critical for future employability [18]. Doing so can promote faster economic integration. Lack of access directly perpetuates unemployment and dependence on state support, reinforcing structural disadvantage. Providing refugees and asylum seekers with subsidized or lent devices and dedicated Wi-Fi for employment-related activities can help overcome these barriers.

Health Access

Healthcare is a universal human right [19], however, the National Health Service (NHS) services increasingly depend on digital systems, such as online booking, telehealth consultations, electronic prescriptions, and app-based communication [12]. These systems assume stable internet access, reliable devices, and confidence navigating digital platforms. For refugees and asylum seekers, these assumptions often do not hold.

A British Red Cross report found that many asylum seekers experienced online healthcare as confusing and impersonal, struggling to communicate their needs effectively. As one participant explained:

“If it’s not one-to-one [an in-person appointment] then it is very difficult to understand the doctor … and it is very difficult to understand the use of sending photos to GP [2].”

Participants described difficulties downloading the NHS app, booking GP appointments online due to lacking an accepted form of identity documentation, and accessing translation services digitally [2]. Limited data, outdated devices, and low digital literacy further restricted access [18, 2]. Some delayed seeking care altogether because they lacked the means or confidence to navigate online systems [2].

These challenges were amplified by knowledge gaps of the healthcare system. Many asylum seekers report uncertainty about their healthcare entitlements, fear of data sharing with the Home Office, and limited awareness of their right to interpreters [2]. Distrust of government institutions can deter timely care, particularly where individuals worry that engaging with services may affect their asylum claim [2].

Digital exclusion compounds these challenges. Without independent access to devices, individuals may rely on others to navigate healthcare platforms, undermining privacy and autonomy [18]. Delayed appointments, miscommunication, and service avoidance can have direct consequences for physical and mental health.

Ensuring equitable access requires more than digitizing services. Refugees and asylum seekers must have reliable internet and up-to-date devices, improved digital literacy support, and inclusive platform design, including simplified registration, multilingual options, and low-data alternatives. Crucially, healthcare must remain accessible through both digital and in-person pathways.

Social Connectivity

“[When I moved from Birmingham to Sheffield, I play some games online]. On that game, we can track each other. So, when I moved here my friend said, ‘where are you now?’, I said, ‘in Sheffield’. On the game, in the chat room, he said, ‘oh my family is there. Can you send me a postcode?’ Then I send my postcode, then exactly that guy who was in Sheffield, he also spent time in the game. So, starting on chat first on the game, ‘where are you living?’ I said, ‘I am in [– –] Road; this is my postcode and my number’, and then after, he said, ‘I am near to [– –] Road’. On the chat room, he says, ‘just give me ten minutes’. After ten minutes, he is coming. He came in my house, so with him I went first to Peace Gardens then Victoria Hall, the library, the books, he showed me all. ”

“My friend they take for me contract. I have data, everything, unlimited everything. My friend is here more than 10 years, they take for me contract.”

For Nawid, digital platforms were essential for maintaining community ties and navigating a new city [20]. Online games and messaging apps allowed him to keep in touch with peers across accommodation locations, arrange face-to-face meetings, and locate resources like libraries and community centers. Once connected to a trusted network, he was able to access a mobile contract [20]. This shows how access to a digital connection allowed him to overcome structural barriers posed by temporary accommodation and lack of access to formal banking systems.

Digital access in this context is both social and functional. Social exclusion reinforces mental health challenges, compounds isolation, and slows adaptation to new environments. Digital connectivity is critical for maintaining a sense of belonging and building new social networks, while also providing the tools needed to participate fully in everyday life. Without such connections, displaced people face isolation, reduced opportunities, and limited access to services.

For these reasons, digital inclusion strategies must go beyond devices and connectivity. Support should integrate trusted community networks such as NGOs working with displaced individuals, and provide guidance for navigating mobile contracts and SIM options.

Gaps in the UK Digital Inclusion Action Plan

The UK government’s Digital Inclusion Action Plan marks an important first step by identifying the following priority groups: low-income households, older people, disabled people, people currently out of work, and young people [5]. However, refugees and asylum seekers are not named explicitly. Instead, they are implicitly folded into broader categories such as “low-income” or “out of work.”

At first glance, this categorization seems logical. Many asylum seekers are indeed low-income and restricted from employment. Nonetheless, the lived experiences documented here demonstrate that digital exclusion for them is not reducible to income alone. Legal blockers, temporary accommodation, restricted banking access, language barriers, and mobility intersect in ways that conventional categories cannot capture [18, 20]. For example, reliance on expensive pay-as-you-go data is driven as much by ASPEN card limitations and temporary housing as by affordability [20]. Similarly, procedural digital dependencies, such as navigating online Home Office or NHS portals, cannot be resolved through financial support or generic skills training alone [2].

Current UK policy focuses on affordability and digital skills [5], yet both pillars rest on assumptions that rarely hold for asylum seekers:

• Stable housing and long-term addresses for broadband or device schemes [18]

• Access to formal banking for contracts and SIM cards [20

• Adequate English literacy and familiarity with institutional processes [2, 7]

For displaced populations, digital exclusion becomes intertwined with legal, social, and economic marginalization, reinforcing dependence on state support and limiting participation in employment, healthcare, and civic life.

Taken together, these gaps suggest that while the UK has initiated important steps toward digital inclusion, its framework still has work to be done. Without recognizing refugees and asylum seekers as a distinct group and accounting for mobility, procedural dependencies, and rights-based access, policies risk addressing only surface-level barriers while leaving systemic exclusions unchallenged.

Policy Recommendations: Lessons from International Frameworks

The UK’s Digital Inclusion Action Plan represents an important starting point, but without inclusive identity solutions, migrants risk exclusion from core services. As digital systems increasingly mediate access to immigration procedures, healthcare, employment, and welfare, the question is no longer simply how to improve connectivity. Instead it is how to ensure that displaced populations can fully participate in a digitized society.

International frameworks offer a broader lens. The UNHCR defines digital inclusion as ensuring equal, meaningful, and safe access to and use of digital technologies, particularly for those in vulnerable or marginalized positions [16]. Crucially, UNHCR frames digital inclusion not only as access to infrastructure, but as a matter of legal enablement, protection, participation, and agency [16]. Its programme emphasizes:

• Legal access to SIM cards and digital financial services

• Inclusion of refugees within national digital strategies

• Digital literacy and online safety

• Protection of personal data

• Opportunities for digital leisure and social connection to support well-being

• Strong partnerships across governments, regulators, telecom providers, and refugee communities

The importance of legal enablement is particularly clear in UNHCR-supported policy reform in Uganda. There, refugees were initially unable to register SIM cards due to identification requirements. However, following coordinated engagement between UNHCR, mobile operators, regulators, and humanitarian actors, the Uganda Communications Commission allowed SIM registration using refugee identity documents. Over 600,000 refugees subsequently gained legal SIM access, and mobile subscriptions increased by 50% [15]. This case illustrates how targeted regulatory reform can significantly expand connectivity and economic participation.

Across the Nordic region, similar principles underpin the development of user-friendly electronic identification (eID) systems that accommodate individuals without permanent national identity numbers [3]. Rather than treating documentation as a prerequisite for digital participation, these models recognize uncertain legal status and design systems accordingly.

Lastly, Nordic policymakers and researchers have begun to shed light into the specific needs of refugee and immigrant women, who have historically been overlooked in digital inclusion efforts [1, 4]. Research collaboration with the Nordic Welfare Centre and Nordregio highlight strategies to promote digital inclusion for immigrant women, such as targeted policies and partnerships with NGOs with a focus on women refugees [3]. By embedding gender and intersectional considerations, these initiatives ensure that digital policies and systems are safe, accessible, and empowering for some of the most marginalized groups.

These examples suggest that digital inclusion must be embedded within legal and belonging frameworks. Building on these lessons, the UK Digital Inclusion framework should:

1. Recognize Refugees and Asylum Seekers as a Standalone Group

• Target programs, improve data collection, and ensure policy aligns with immigration, welfare, and digital strategies [8].

2. Treat Digital Access as Rights-Enabling Infrastructure

• Explicitly acknowledge that connectivity enables communication with legal representatives, submission of asylum documents, access to NHS services, and civic participation [20].

3. Address Structural Affordability Barriers

• Consider fixed asylum support rates, lack of banking access, temporary accommodation, and inability to enter standard contracts [20, 2, 10].

• Implement subsidized mobile data packages, flexible SIM contracts, mobile Wi-FI, and device-lending schemes embedded within accommodations [7].

4. Provide Multilingual, Informed Digital Navigation Support

• Offer guidance in multiple languages, explain institutional processes and address mistrust of digital systems [7].

5. Strengthen Community and Civil Society Partnerships

• Leverage community ambassadors, peer mentors, and informal networks that bridge structural gaps [3].

• Ensure refugees can provide feedback to shape service design [8].

• Partner with refugee-led or refugee-serving organizations to co-design safe, culturally sensitive, and empowering digital services [3]. Some include the following: Breaking Barriers, Conversation Over Borders, Screen Share, and the Afghanistan & Central Asian Association.

6. Align Digital Inclusion with Broader Social Integration

• Recognize the intersection between digital inclusion, social isolation, mental and physical health, and financial insecurity [7].

7. Embed Gender and Intersectionality in Digital Inclusion

• Apply gender analysis to understand how factors such as migration status, caregiving responsibilities, trauma, and social norms intersect to shape access, participation, and digital risks [1].

• Collect and disaggregate data by gender, age, disability, and other relevant demographics to inform policy and program design [17].

• Ensure digital inclusion initiatives protect privacy, mitigate gender-based risks, and support inclusion for the most marginalized groups [17].

By integrating international insights with targeted domestic reform, the UK has the opportunity to reposition digital inclusion as more than a social support measure. As asylum procedures, healthcare systems, and employment pathways increasingly move online, connectivity becomes intertwined with the ability to exercise rights and participate fully in society.

The UK Digital Inclusion framework can therefore evolve beyond a model centered primarily on affordability and skills, toward one that recognizes connectivity as rights-enabling infrastructure for displaced populations. In a digitized society, exclusion from the internet can translate directly into exclusion from opportunity, services, and community. Ensuring digital inclusion for refugees and asylum seekers enables equity and fundamental rights.

References

[1] Bartlett, A. I., Mena Montes, N., Verheijen, L., Leurs, K., & Broersma, M. (2026, January 14). Digital tactics of refugee women: Towards an inclusive framework for digital literacies. Social Inclusion, 14, Article 10866. https://doi.org/10.17645/si.10866

[2] British Red Cross. (2023, April). Offline and isolated: Understanding how digital exclusion impacts people experiencing crisis in the UK (Report). British Red Cross. https://assets.redcross.org.uk/82b1e254-5524-0172-0612-9ce813c7824c/f34e884d-7121-46a8-a795-8fb5867322f7/British-Red-Cross-Offline-and-Isolated-report.pdf

[3] Brynteson, M., & Jessen, S. (2025). Promoting digital inclusion of immigrant women in the Nordic countries (Nord 2025:020). Nordic Welfare Centre/Nordregio. https://pub.norden.org/nord2025-020/5-discussion-ways-to-promote-digital-inclusion-of-immigrant-women.html

[4] Brynteson, M., & Jessen, S. (2025). Promoting digital inclusion of immigrant women in the Nordic countries. Nordic Welfare Centre. https://nordicwelfare.org/en/publikationer/promoting-digital-inclusion-of-immigrant-women-in-the-nordic-countries/

[5] Department for Science, Innovation and Technology. (2025, February 26). Digital Inclusion Action Plan: First steps. GOV.UK. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/digital-inclusion-action-plan-first-steps/digital-inclusion-action-plan-first-steps

[6] Department for Science, Innovation and Technology. (2025, July 17). Digital inclusion action plan: Summary of responses (published 17 July 2025). GOV.UK. https://www.gov.uk/government/calls-for-evidence/digital-inclusion-action-plan/outcome/digital-inclusion-action-plan-summary-of-responses-published-17-july-2025

[7] Digital Inclusion UK. (2024, May 31). Asylum seekers, refugees and digital exclusion in the UK. https://www.digitalinclusionuk.org/research/asylum-seekers-refugees-and-digital-exclusion-in-the-uk

[8] Elmustafa, R. (2025, June 4). Digital lifelines for communities in crisis. UNHCR Innovation Service. https://medium.com/unhcr-innovation-service/digital-lifelines-for-communities-in-crisis-68d4900663b5

[9] Home Office. (n.d.). About us – Home Office. GOV.UK. https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/home-office/about

[10] Jama, H. (2022, August 4). Reducing digital exclusion for refugees and people seeking asylum in the UK. Refugee Action. https://www.refugee-action.org.uk/reducing-digital-exclusion-for-refugees-and-people-seeking-asylum-in-the-uk/

[11] Moreno, V. (2025, July 7). Community‑driven digital literacy for self‑reliance. UNHCR Innovation Service. https://medium.com/unhcr-innovation-service/community-driven-digital-literacy-for-self-reliance-5590c63a8c09

[12] NHS England Digital. (2025, September 23). Digital tools to support modern ways of working within general practice. NHS England Digital. https://digital.nhs.uk/services/digital-services-for-integrated-care/digital-tools-to-support-modern-ways-of-working-within-general-practice

[13] Schmuecker, K., Matejic, P., Bestwick, M., & Clark, T. (2022, July 25). Going without: Deepening poverty in the UK. Joseph Rowntree Foundation. https://www.jrf.org.uk/deep-poverty-and-destitution/going-without-deepening-poverty-in-the-uk

[14] UK Visas and Immigration. (2025, October 28). Information booklet about your asylum application. GOV.UK. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/information-leaflet-for-asylum-applications/information-booklet-about-your-asylum-application--2

[15] UN-Habitat. (2021). Addressing the digital divide: Taking action towards digital inclusion. UN-Habitat. https://unhabitat.org/sites/default/files/2021/11/addressing_the_digital_divide.pdf

[16] UNHCR. (n.d.). Digital inclusion programme. UNHCR Innovation Service. https://www.unhcr.org/innovation/digital-inclusion/

[17] UN Women. (2022, December). Gender analysis in technical areas: Digital inclusion (Guidance note). UN Women. https://www.unwomen.org/sites/default/files/2022-12/Gender%20Analysis%20Guidance_Digital_Inclusion.pdf

[18] Van Rhee, E., & Love‑Edmonds, F. (2024, October 22). Unlocking opportunities: The crucial role of digital inclusion for refugees. Conversation Over Borders. https://www.conversationoverborders.org/post/unlocking-opportunities-the-crucial-role-of-digital-inclusion-for-refugees

[19] World Health Organization. (2023, December 1). Human rights and health [Fact sheet]. https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/human-rights-and-health

[20] Yazici, E. (2025). Internet access, place and belonging in the British asylum system. New Media & Society, 27(10), 5803–5821. https://doi.org/10.1177/14614448241257216

Climate Change: A Catalyst for Large-Scale Displacement

In 2024, climate disasters resulted in a record 46 million people around the world being displaced domestically, with 11 million in the US alone.[1] From droughts to hurricanes, from wildfires to floods, extreme climate events have been putting more and more people at risk. Hurricane Milton, for example, resulted in evacuation orders for nearly 6 million people in Florida.[2] The 2025 LA wildfires saw more than 179,000 people forced to leave their homes and communities.[3] In the last 15 years, climate disasters have affected more than 90% of counties in the US, which are home to more than 93% of the population.[4] The strength and frequency of such events are not only increasing but increasing at alarming rates. Regions of the USA which are not used to dealing with major climate events are also seeing increased disasters, such as Vermont which saw major flooding in 2023 and 2024.

The forced displacements seen during these events are not just temporary moves to avoid the immediate aftermath. Return and recovery are not always guaranteed, and the privilege of being able to both return and recover is not universal. 40% of the victims of Hurricane Katrina were never able to return.[5] A year on from the LA wildfires, less than 0.1% of the homes that were destroyed have been rebuilt. The scale of human loss, too, exceeds what official figures suggest. While 31 deaths were recorded directly by Los Angeles County, a peer-reviewed study published in JAMA estimated that the fires contributed to at least 440 deaths in total — nearly fifteen times the official count — when accounting for excess mortality from smoke inhalation, the collapse of healthcare access, and the deterioration of pre-existing conditions. Official death tolls are not designed to capture this kind of slow, diffuse dying, and that gap between what is counted and what is real is itself part of the story. Delayed and insufficient insurance payouts and the withholding of federal assistance further contribute to the inability to recover, which in the case of the LA wildfires was 73% higher for Black people.[6] The quickest and most important source of help is government-funded assistance, primarily distributed through FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency). More often, however, such aid is not enough, and people often end up using their savings and retirement holdings to try and get through. Aid through FEMA, disaster loans, insurance payouts, and similar mechanisms also face the issue of systematically favouring payouts to white, well-off recipients,[7] only exacerbating the gap in risk faced by different groups of people.

The immediate risk posed by individual events is not the only way climate change results in displacement. By 2050, the natural landscape of the US will look markedly different, with increasing loss of habitat and arable land.[8] The Midwest will see more heatwaves and more flooding, impacting the farming sector. States like Arizona and New Mexico have seen extended droughts leading to loss of useful land through desertification.[9]

Nearly 40% of the US population lives in coastal counties, which are highly susceptible to dangers posed by sea level rise. Major cities like New York City[10] and Boston[11] have spent billions building resiliency projects to protect residents and real estate against sea level rise and storm surges. Smaller towns and population centers, however, lack the funding and infrastructure to handle major events. In 2017, the US federal government funded a relocation project to move all families living on Isle de Jean Charles inland. Isle de Jean Charles has lost approximately 98% of its land due to sea level rise. This relocation of the fishing community has failed on multiple fronts, destroying not just the lifestyle but also the sense of community that existed amongst the predominantly Native American population.[12] Projections for sea level rise and flooding along the Louisiana coastline suggest that the relocation site itself may eventually face similar risks — a reminder that managed retreat, without serious investment in long-term climate mitigation, is at best a temporary solution.[13] The US government has concluded that it neither has the plans nor the funds to treat relocation as a viable solution at scale.[14]

2. The Science Behind the Disasters

To understand how we arrived here and what lies ahead, it helps to start with the science that the federal government is now actively working to suppress.

Greenhouse gases (such as carbon dioxide (CO₂) and methane) play a vital role in the atmosphere. These gases trap the heat being reflected from the surface of the earth, a natural process known as the greenhouse effect, which is crucial in warming the planet and keeping surface temperatures above freezing.

Post-Industrial Revolution, anthropogenic activities — primarily the burning of fossil fuels — have led to a significant increase in levels of these greenhouse gases, far beyond what the carbon sinks (such as plants and oceans) can naturally remove.[25] This continuous addition of CO₂ has resulted in an explosion of atmospheric CO₂ levels, with current rates almost three times as high as those seen just 60 years ago.[26] (Fig. 1)

Fig. 1. Temporal Trend in atmospheric CO₂ levels (blue) and human emissions (grey). Source: climate.gov [26]

This increase in carbon dioxide and the subsequent warming of the planet has led to devastating consequences. Research on the impacts of climate change has demonstrated how it has driven weather extremes such as hotter heatwaves, longer droughts, stronger wildfires, and heavier rainfall and flooding.[27] From intergovernmental bodies such as the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change[28] to academic collaborations such as the World Weather Attribution project,[29] there is strong scientific consensus on the impact of climate change on the frequency and intensity of climate disasters. This impact has been felt globally, with recent decades having seen a marked increase in extreme climate events.[30] (Fig. 2) Year on year, this increase has only been getting worse, with the count of extreme events in 2024 doubling the 2003–2020 average.[31] This increased exposure to extreme climate events only leads to higher risk for humans going forward. Studies have shown that relative to a person born in 1960, a person born in 2020 is projected to experience at least two to three times as many climate disaster events over the course of their lives, with the majority projected to experience unprecedented levels of heatwaves, and with lower-income populations at increased vulnerability.[32]

Fig. 2. Temporal Trend in the count and types of global extreme climate disaster events. Source: un.org [30]

3. The State of the Union

To understand the scale of the issue at hand, we will look at the kinds of disasters we are projected to face (Hazard), the populations and infrastructure that will face these hazards (Exposure), and the extent to which we are equipped to handle them and the degree to which we are susceptible to damage (Vulnerability).

3.1 Hazard

Much like the rest of the world, the US faces an ever-increasing frequency of climate disasters. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) defines billion-dollar disasters as those climate events whose total damage or costs exceed 1 billion USD.[33] In the 1980s, the US experienced around 3.3 such disasters per year; in the 2020s, this has increased to 23 per year.[34] In 2024 alone, there were 27 events, including Hurricane Helene (219 deaths; ~$80 billion in damages), Hurricane Milton (32 deaths; $34.3 billion), and Hurricane Beryl (46 deaths; $7.2 billion).[35] (Fig. 3)

The concern is not just that the count of such events is increasing, but also their increasing extent and intensity. Studies have shown that without climate change, Milton would not have reached Category 5 levels.[36] Fifteen of the 20 largest wildfires in California have occurred in the past 10 years.[37] The National Weather Service (NWS) declared 91 flash flood emergencies in 2024, the most ever in a single year.[38] Some of these floods were a result of rainfall extremes so severe they carry a 0.1% probability of occurring in any given year.[39]

Fig. 3. Billion-Dollar Climate Disasters in 2024. Source: ncei.noaa.gov [35]

3.2 Exposure

As the disasters are getting worse, they are also impacting more people and infrastructure. A major driver of this is the increasing migration trend into areas highly susceptible to climate disasters. Studies have shown that internal migration in the US is moving people into areas with heightened wildfire risk at increasing rates.[40] In the US context, the reasons for moving within the country are still driven by economic factors.[41] Regions like the Northwest, Texas, and Florida provide better economic opportunities, attracting people regardless of the fact that these regions are vulnerable to wildfires and hurricanes. Economic factors also drive people into metropolitan areas which often have hotter summers. This migration pattern drives development in such areas, thereby exposing more infrastructure to the hazards. With increasing intensity and extent of disasters, more and more of the infrastructure in these areas also comes under risk. The nearly 40% of the US population living in coastal communities, for example, face increasing risk from rising sea levels and storm surges.

The billion-dollar events of the 2020s have resulted in annual damages of, on average, approximately $150 billion. By comparison, the 1980–2025 average is approximately $65 billion.[42] This damage spans a wide variety of assets — damaged homes, hospitals, roads, and transit networks — the loss of which can have long-term impacts both on the individual and on the community as a whole.

3.3 Vulnerability

Inequality is as American as apple pie,[43] and vulnerability to climate risk is no exception. This inequality reveals itself along various lines, from income to race to class. Housing policies like redlining have resulted in minority communities being clustered in areas that are far more vulnerable.[44] From worse infrastructure, lower incomes, and language barriers, to reduced access to mitigation measures, climate disasters impact poorer and minority communities harder not just during the disaster but in the recovery as well.[45]

Black communities, in the Southeast in particular, are 1.4 times more likely to experience extreme heat, 1.6 times more likely to face hurricanes, and 1.8 times more likely to experience extreme floods.[46] Indigenous communities, who have lost approximately 99% of their historic land, face heightened vulnerability to climate events.[47] People of color and lower-income populations also tend to live in weaker housing, often in areas with weaker building codes, leading to greater impact and a greater need for assistance.[48] Studies on FEMA disaster aid distribution have highlighted how white households and white communities often receive greater aid than communities of color for similar levels of damage.[49][50] Post-disaster, the recovery stage widens racial segregation both via abandonment — where wealthier residents, who tend to be white, resettle permanently elsewhere — and via displacement, where lack of access to resources such as homeowners insurance forces Black residents, who are more likely to be renters, to leave their homes and communities.[51]

80% of the US population lives in urban areas, an increase of 6.4% between 2010 and 2020. This trend will continue to increase, placing further strain on cities to build not just infrastructure but sustainable and resilient infrastructure. The urban heat island effect seen in cities further exacerbates rising temperatures, with minority communities once again most at risk. Studies have found that in almost 97% of US cities, poor communities and people of color live in hotter neighbourhoods than white residents.[52]

4. What Do Americans Think?

While some regions that have experienced high rates of disaster — such as frequent flooding — have seen a trend of outward migration,[15] the current population shifts in the US show a strong movement of people towards high-risk areas, particularly Texas, Florida, and Arizona. These migrations are driven by multiple reasons, primarily better economic opportunities in growing urban centers and the desire to move away from rising costs.

Migration patterns in the US are predominantly oriented towards urban areas, with 90% of the US population expected to live in cities by 2050.[16]

While more Americans are starting to treat global warming as a threat than ever before, and almost 40% have been exposed to a climate disaster in the past two years, polls have found that a majority of Americans still do not believe that climate change will meaningfully affect their own lives.[17] This disconnect between witnessed disaster and perceived personal risk is one of the defining features of the current moment.

These polls, backed by further studies,[18] show a very clear partisan split in the outlook on climate risk. 78% of Democrats believe climate change will pose a serious threat during their lifetime; for Republicans, the figure is 14%.[17] Further, 74% of Democrats believe that the heightened damage of recent disaster events has been exacerbated by federal inaction, whereas 64% of Republicans believe it is the result of natural phenomena producing stronger floods and storms.[19] Despite 4 in 10 Americans having experienced a major climate disaster event recently, for most, climate change and its consequences are not yet perceived as something that will directly impact their lives.

5. The Federal Response

The oil and gas industry spent nearly half a billion USD during the 2024 election cycle, primarily towards the campaign of Donald Trump and other down-ballot Republicans.[20]

What followed reflects a structural alignment — not merely a partisan one — between federal policy and fossil fuel interests. Notably, US oil production reached record highs under both the Biden and Trump administrations,[21] a fact that cuts across party lines and points to a dependence on fossil fuels that no single election cycle has reversed. The current administration has simply made this alignment explicit. The oil industry has received tens of billions in annual tax incentives and subsidies. Federal funding cuts, framed as efficiency measures, have impacted organisations like FEMA (aid and recovery), NOAA (monitoring and prediction), and the NWS (forecasts and warnings) significantly. Louisiana, which is highly susceptible to sea level rise and flooding, has seen $700 million in FEMA funds intended for disaster mitigation projects withheld. Meanwhile, FEMA has plans to provide states with $600 million to build migrant detention centres.[22] Proposed changes to FEMA aid allocation hint at not only raising the threshold for states to request federal aid, but also determining aid based on the type and strength of the disaster alone and not based on the damage caused.[23] The risk a community faces from a climate disaster is not just about the hazard itself. Different regions have different vulnerabilities to various types of climate events, and areas with poorer and majority-minority populations are often less equipped to handle major events. Passing the responsibility for disaster recovery onto state and local governments will only lead to further inadequacies in people receiving the aid they need. With ever-increasing urbanisation, most cities need to undertake major infrastructure projects to both support incoming populations and mitigate the damage of future climate disasters.

In February 2026, the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) finalized the rescission of its 2009 Endangerment Finding, the foundational legal instrument that established greenhouse gases as a threat to public health and welfare, and upon which virtually all federal climate regulation for the past sixteen years had rested. Without it, the EPA lacks statutory authority under the Clean Air Act to mandate greenhouse gas emission standards. The immediate effect is the repeal of emissions standards for motor vehicles; the broader implications for power plants, oil and gas facilities, and other major emitters are now being contested in court.[24] What is not in dispute is the direction of travel: the federal government has systematically dismantled the scientific and legal architecture that made climate action possible.

All of these actions by the federal administration are part of a deliberate effort to ensure that the oil industry is not regulated or curtailed. The consequences cannot be overstated.

6. Conclusion

In 2007, a major tornado destroyed 95% of the small town of Greensburg, Kansas. During the rebuilding stage, the city pivoted to becoming a “green” town, requiring all new buildings to be LEED certified. Today the town draws its power from 10 wind turbines. Yet the population never recovered. After Hurricane Sandy, residents of some of the most affected neighbourhoods in Staten Island were offered government buyouts for their homes. Such properties are by law required to remain open space, more often than not converted to parks. Relocation due to climate disasters is often still a local phenomenon; people tend to move to nearby areas which are safer. The people who are being left behind are the ones who need the most help.

These stories share a common thread: when displacement is treated as a logistical problem rather than a human one, recovery fails. The question of who gets to return, who is resourced to rebuild, and whose loss is counted is not answered by meteorology. It is answered by the policy choices made before, during, and after a disaster strikes. Effective response requires centering the people most affected, not just in relief efforts, but in the design of the systems that govern long-term recovery. When displacement is treated as a logistical problem rather than a human one, recovery fails in predictable ways: managed retreat without investment in the people being moved, aid frameworks that systematically exclude the most vulnerable, and relocation programs that sever community ties and leave people without economic footing. These are not failures of resources. They are failures of priorities.

As one of the largest emitters of greenhouse gases and the wealthiest country in the world, the US has both a responsibility and the capacity to lead on this. That leadership begins not with grand infrastructure projects or symbolic pledges, but with the far harder work of building policy that treats displaced people as participants in their own recovery, not as problems to be managed.

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References

[1] https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/hurricanes-wildfires-and-other-disasters-displaced-a-record-46-million/

[2] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/08/weather/hurricane-milton-florida-evacuations.html

[3] https://www.npr.org/2025/01/11/g-s1-42247/la-wildfires-california-containment-evacuation

[4] https://apnews.com/article/science-united-states-emergency-management-climate-and-environment-4663b776dd05fb4114276b31e503b77c

[5] https://www.americanprogress.org/article/when-you-cant-go-home/

[6] https://apnews.com/article/california-wildfires-la-altadena-rebuild-home-construction-c7bc38063fd8db94dc96522d9e60a836

[7] https://www.npr.org/2019/03/05/688786177/how-federal-disaster-money-favors-the-rich

[8] https://magazine.columbia.edu/article/americas-great-climate-migration-has-begun-heres-what-you-need-know

[9] https://earth.org/desertification-and-climate-change-whats-the-link

[10] https://e360.yale.edu/features/new-york-city-climate-plan-sea-level-rise

[11] https://www.boston.gov/departments/climate-resilience/coastal-resilience-implementation

[12] https://insideclimatenews.org/news/28092025/louisiana-isle-de-jean-charles-climate-relocation/

[13] https://app.climatecentral.org/coastal-risk-finder

[14] https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-20-488.pdf

[15] https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-023-43493-8#Sec5

[16] https://css.umich.edu/publications/factsheets/built-environment/us-cities-factsheet

[17] https://news.gallup.com/poll/659387/record-high-call-global-warming-serious-threat.aspx

[18] https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7935693/

[19] https://navigatorresearch.org/a-majority-of-americans-see-climate-change-as-a-serious-problem-today/

[20] https://climatepower.us/news/new-report-oil-and-gas-industry-spent-450-million-to-influence-trump-and-the-119th-congress/

[21] https://theconversation.com/under-both-trump-and-biden-harris-us-oil-and-gas-production-surged-to-record-highs-despite-very-different-energy-goals-236859

[22] https://www.reuters.com/legal/government/us-states-get-608-million-fema-build-migrant-detention-centers-2025-07-25/

[23] https://www.npr.org/2026/02/17/nx-s1-5698320/fema-reform-trump-hurricane-earthquake

[24] https://www.epa.gov/regulations-emissions-vehicles-and-engines/final-rule-rescission-greenhouse-gas-endangerment

[25] https://science.nasa.gov/climate-change/extreme-weather/

[26] https://www.climate.gov/news-features/understanding-climate/climate-change-atmospheric-carbon-dioxide

[27] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cy4dgp1p3p1o

[28] https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg1/chapter/chapter-11/

[29] https://www.worldweatherattribution.org/

[30] https://www.un.org/en/content/action-agenda-on-internal-displacement/climate-related-disasters.shtml

[31] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jun/17/nasa-data-reveals-dramatic-rise-in-intensity-of-weather-events

[32] https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-025-08907-1#citeas

[33] https://www.ncei.noaa.gov/access/billions/faq

[34] https://environmentamerica.org/center/updates/there-were-23-billion-dollar-weather-disasters-in-the-u-s-in-2025/

[35] https://www.ncei.noaa.gov/access/billions/

[36] https://www.pbsnc.org/blogs/science/warming-oceans-made-every-atlantic-hurricane-in-2024-stronger/

[37] https://www.fire.ca.gov/our-impact/statistics

[38] https://www.cnn.com/2024/10/25/weather/record-numbers-of-an-extreme-warning-show-the-reality-of-climate-change

[39] https://www.cnn.com/2025/07/20/climate/summer-of-flooding

[40] https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/human-dynamics/articles/10.3389/fhumd.2022.886545/full

[41] https://www.wired.com/story/americans-are-moving-into-danger-zones/

[42] https://www.climate.gov/news-features/blogs/beyond-data/2024-active-year-us-billion-dollar-weather-and-climate-disasters

[43] https://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2018/06/22/UN-report-With-40M-in-poverty-US-most-unequal-developed-nation/8671529664548/

[44] https://www.americanprogress.org/article/how-climate-change-is-fueling-more-deadly-and-destructive-floods

[45] https://www.americanprogress.org/article/climate-change-fueled-hurricanes-are-increasingly-destructive-and-costly-for-u-s-communities/

[46] https://www.cnn.com/2023/12/01/us/black-communities-greater-climate-risk-reaj

[47] https://environment.yale.edu/news/article/near-total-loss-historical-lands-leaves-indigenous-nations-us-more-vulnerable-climate

[48] https://www.worldwildlife.org/resources/explainers/is-climate-change-increasing-the-risk-of-disasters/

[49] https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/07/climate/FEMA-race-climate.html

[50] https://studentreview.hks.harvard.edu/racial-disparity-in-disaster-response-in-the-united-states-a-case-study-of-aid-under-fema/

[51] https://journalistsresource.org/environment/tornado-racial-segregation/

[52] https://www.eenews.net/articles/climate-racism-is-real-researchers-found-it-in-u-s-cities/

The Crisis in Numbers

The scale of forced displacement has reached unprecedented levels. According to the UNHCR, at the end of 2023 there were at least 117.3 million forcibly displaced people worldwide — 40 percent of whom are children, approximately 47 million young people.¹ The average length of displacement ranges from 10 to 26 years, meaning that millions of children will spend their entire childhood, and some their entire lives, without returning home.²

Compare those figures to global averages: 102% gross enrollment at the primary level, 77% at secondary, 42% in higher education.³ The gap is not incidental. It reflects cumulative failures of policy, funding, and political will.

The situation for internally displaced children — those who have fled danger without crossing an international border — is even more opaque. A chronic lack of data on internally displaced persons (IDPs) makes comprehensive assessment nearly impossible. What evidence does exist confirms that “most internally displaced children live in countries with some of the largest disparities in access to education and lowest outcomes in the world.”⁴

Despite these realities, the financial architecture built to respond to displacement is now contracting. As of early 2026, only 69 of 193 UN member states had paid their budgetary contributions for the year. The United States and China — the two largest donors — were not among them. The UN’s human rights machinery is now, in the words of High Commissioner Volker Türk, operating in “survival mode.”⁵

The Legal Foundation and Its Fractures

The right to education is not aspirational — it is legally codified. Article 26 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights states plainly that “everyone has the right to education.” The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees reinforces this right for displaced persons specifically. In 1993, the Vienna Declaration elevated Human Rights Education as a mechanism for bridging rights theory and rights practice.⁶ More recently, the 2024 INEE Minimum Standards, the Education Cannot Wait initiative (2016), and the Global Compact for Refugees (2018) each reasserted the international community’s commitment to educating displaced populations.

Yet as Dr. Tristan McCowan has argued, the UNDHR’s foundational framing contains critical shortcomings that persist today. The document identifies education too narrowly with formal schooling, restricts absolute rights to elementary level, and says too little about what education should achieve. McCowan proposes reframing the right to education to encompass both intrinsically valuable processes that embody respect for human rights, and access to institutions and experiences that confer genuine positional advantage — the ability to compete and participate in global society.⁷

If human rights are only accessible to the wealthy and privileged, they are meaningless.— Tristan McCowan, Reframing the Universal Right to Education (2010)

Joel Spring articulated the deeper purpose of education for marginalized groups: to give people “the power to mediate the relation between their own cultures and the current world system.”⁸ Stripped of this power through lack of education, displaced children navigate an increasingly complex international legal landscape without tools for self-advocacy or economic participation.

Who Bears Responsibility — and Who Is Failing

Katarina Tomaševski’s influential 4A framework — Availability, Accessibility, Acceptability, Adaptability — identifies governments as the primary agents obligated to deliver education rights. In theory, international refugee law creates a uniform distribution of responsibility: all states must admit refugees and uphold their rights. In practice, as Betts and Collier have documented, this uniform responsibility is unevenly met.⁹

This distributional problem is compounded by geography. Seventy-three percent of the world’s displaced persons are hosted in low and lower-middle-income countries.¹⁰ The World Bank and UNHCR estimate the annual cost of providing quality, inclusive education to refugee students in these countries at approximately US$4.85 billion. The gap between need and available resources is vast — and growing wider as donor states reduce their UN contributions.

Bullard and Jalbout argue persuasively that inclusion in national education systems — not parallel refugee-only programs — is the most effective and sustainable model for delivering education rights. This means not merely ensuring attendance, but adapting classroom content, pedagogies, and school culture so that displaced children “feel supported, included, and connected to their identity, communities, and school culture.”¹¹ State-led inclusion remains the gold standard; but where states fail, the role of non-state humanitarian actors and IGOs becomes essential, provided these interventions aim at eventual reintegration rather than permanent parallel schooling.

The Hidden Asset: Refugee Teachers

One of the most underutilized resources in delivering quality education to displaced children is the refugee teacher. Ericka Richardson establishes that the teacher is the most important in-school factor affecting educational quality. Refugee teachers bring irreplaceable assets: language skills, cultural knowledge, and first-hand experience of displacement that positions them uniquely to support displaced learners from their communities of origin.¹²

Yet host country policies frequently prevent refugee teachers from working legally or earning salaries in public education systems. This reflects what Bullard and Jalbout characterize as a “deficit perspective” — a framework that views refugees as a burden rather than contributors. An asset perspective, by contrast, recognizes that when refugees are empowered to teach, work, and participate, they become net contributors to host societies while restoring their own autonomy and dignity.

Refugees can access opportunities not only to learn and teach, but also to heal, see themselves reflected in the systems around them, feel included in their communities, and imagine a future for themselves.— Bullard & Jalbout, Key Tensions in Refugee Education (2022)

The Stakes of Defunding: A Warning

As the 61st session of the Human Rights Council convenes this week, it does so under conditions that would have been difficult to imagine when the Council was founded two decades ago. Wars in Sudan, Ukraine, Gaza, and Myanmar generate displacement at industrial scale. Climate change induces its own category of mass dislocation. And the institutional architecture built to respond faces acute financial strain.

The 15% budget reduction to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights is not merely an administrative adjustment. When the bodies responsible for monitoring, reporting on, and advocating for human rights are defunded, violations become harder to document, harder to address, and easier to perpetrate. In 2025, OHCHR monitoring work was already reduced by over 50 percent. The narrowing of the Council’s session by half a week means fewer days to scrutinize education crises in Sudan, fewer opportunities to hold states accountable for their commitments under the Global Compact for Refugees.¹³

The 9% higher education enrollment rate for refugees does not represent a policy failure awaiting a technical fix. It represents a choice. A collective, ongoing choice by the international community about who among the world’s youth deserve a future.

Recommendations

The literature surveyed here converges on several urgent conclusions as the Human Rights Council convenes its 61st session:

1. Member states must fulfill financial obligations to the UN system. The liquidity crisis undermining the Human Rights Council, UNHCR, and related bodies directly compromises the delivery of education rights to displaced children.

2. Host states must move toward inclusive national education models. Parallel refugee education systems are neither sustainable nor equitable. Meaningful inclusion requires adaptation of curriculum, pedagogy, and school culture.

3. Refugee teachers must be granted the right to work. Restricting qualified educators from employment is both a human rights violation and an act of institutional self-harm that deprives displaced communities of their most valuable educational resource.

4. Data collection on internally displaced children must be urgently improved. The absence of reliable IDP education data renders millions of displaced children invisible to policy and accountability mechanisms.

5. Education for displaced persons must be reframed as investment, not charity. The estimated US$4.85 billion annual cost of inclusive refugee education is a fraction of the long-term costs of a generation educated in exclusion — or not educated at all.

The displaced children of today are the adults of a world we are already building. What kind of world that will be depends, in no small part, on whether we choose to educate them.

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Notes

1.UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2023 (Geneva: UNHCR, June 2024). The 117.3 million figure represents all categories of forced displacement. Children represent approximately 40% of this total, yielding an estimated 47 million.

2.Elizabeth Ferris, “When Refugee Displacement Drags On, Is Self-Reliance the Answer?” Brookings Institution, June 19, 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/when-refugee-displacement-drags-on-is-self-reliance-the-answer/.

3.UNHCR, Refugee Education Report 2023 (Geneva: UNHCR, September 2023); INEE, “Refugee Education,” https://inee.org/collections/refugee-education. Global averages from UNHCR Global Report 2023, Outcome Areas: Education. Enrollment rates reflect 2022 reporting-country data.

4.Christelle Cazabat and Laura Yasukawa, Informing Better Access to Education for IDPs (Geneva: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2022), https://www.internal-displacement.org/publications/informing-better-access-to-education-for-idps/.

5.Swissinfo.ch, “Twenty Years After Its Creation, the Human Rights Council Is Under Pressure,” February 2026, https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/international-geneva/twenty-years-after-its-creation-the-human-rights-council-is-under-pressure/90982470; Geneva Solutions, “UN Human Rights Branch ‘In Survival Mode’ as Funding Dries Up,” December 23, 2025, https://genevasolutions.news/human-rights/un-human-rights-branch-in-survival-mode-as-funding-dries-up.

6.Monisha Bajaj and Nadia Mabona, “Theories of Human Rights Education in Comparative and International Education,” in The Bloomsbury Handbook of Theory in Comparative and International Education (London: Bloomsbury, 2021), 361.

7.Tristan McCowan, “Reframing the Universal Right to Education,” Comparative Education 46, no. 4 (2010): 509–525, https://doi.org/10.1080/03050068.2010.519482.

8.Joel H. Spring, The Universal Right to Education: Justification, Definition, and Guidelines (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2000), 18.

9.Katarina Tomaševski, Human Rights Obligations: Making Education Available, Accessible, Acceptable and Adaptable (Stockholm: Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, 2001), 8; Alexander Betts and Paul Collier, Refuge: Rethinking Refugee Policy in a Changing World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 208.

10.UNHCR, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2024 (Geneva: UNHCR, June 2025); UNHCR, Mid-Year Trends 2025 (Geneva: UNHCR, November 4, 2025), https://www.unhcr.org/media/mid-year-trends-2025.

11.Katy Bullard and Maysa Jalbout, “Key Tensions in Refugee Education,” Brookings Institution, November 16, 2022, 4, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/key-tensions-in-refugee-education/.

12.Ericka Richardson, Teachers of Refugees: A Review of the Literature (Washington, DC: ERIC Clearinghouse, 2018), 27–32.

13.International Service for Human Rights (ISHR), “UN80 Reform: States Endorse Slashing of Human Rights Budget,” January 2026, https://ishr.ch/latest-updates/un80-reform-states-endorse-slashing-of-human-rights-budget/; fundsforNGOs News, “Funding Shortfall at UN Puts Human Rights Programs at Risk,” February 16, 2026, https://news.fundsforngos.org/2026/02/16/funding-shortfall-at-un-puts-human-rights-programs-at-risk/.

How the withdrawal of international funding is dismantling the last remaining lifelines for millions of people already consumed by war.

The Global Aid Cuts

The global humanitarian sector faces an unprecedented crisis, marked by the “deepest funding cuts ever recorded.”[1] Major donors, including the US and UK, have frozen or slashed aid — the US halted USAID funding in January, while the UK is cutting its budget from 0.5% to 0.3% of GNI by 2027/28, leaving an aid budget of approximately £9.2 billion (approximately $7.63 billion today).[2][3] Public funding is projected to contract by 34–45% compared to 2023.[4] UN agencies are responding with 30–40% cost reductions, warning that tens of millions face hunger or displacement.[5] The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) scaled back its 2025 appeal from $47.4 billion to $29 billion, reaching fewer people amid “brutal funding cuts.”[6] The OECD also projects a 9–17% fall in official development assistance in 2025.[7]

As of 31 December 2024, OCHA reported US$994 million in requirements for Myanmar’s Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan (HNRP), with only 27% funded; total reported funding “to Myanmar” was US$408 million, with US$361 million for the HNRP.[8] Reported top donors for HNRP funding included the United States, Australia, ECHO, Japan, and the United Kingdom (among others).[9] ACAPS estimates the U.S. provided roughly 25–40% of Myanmar’s humanitarian funding between 2019–2024 — meaning that synchronized pullbacks by multiple donors (not only the U.S.) can produce immediate system-wide failure points.[10]

UN Financial Collapse

The United Nations is facing an “imminent financial collapse” and could run out of money by July 2026. The crisis is driven largely by outstanding mandatory fees — the United States alone owes more than $4.6 billion and accounts for roughly 95% of the debt owed to the organization.[11]

U.S. Aid Cuts: Shuttering Lifelines in Myanmar

Amid this emergency, the United States — formerly Myanmar’s largest humanitarian donor — abruptly halted USAID funding in early 2025, as part of a broader retreat in foreign aid.[12] This pullback (along with cuts by other Western donors) created an aid vacuum with cascading effects on Myanmar’s fragile support systems. A joint field report by HART and Fortify Rights in mid-2025 warned that the cuts “de-funded health clinics, women’s shelters, child protection services, essential medicines, vaccinations, access to legal aid, emergency food distribution [and] independent monitoring of human rights violations.”[13]

In practice, entire lifelines for vulnerable communities have been dismantled.

Healthcare Collapse

Dozens of rural clinics and mobile health teams have shut down due to lack of funds.[14] Critical programs for diseases like HIV, tuberculosis and malaria have been halted, leaving hundreds of thousands of people across the region at risk of losing access to lifesaving treatment.[15] Local medics report widespread medicine stock-outs and service suspensions.[16]

Tragically, multiple people with chronic illnesses have already died in border areas in the wake of the aid suspension, as clinics closed and medicine supplies dried up.[17]

Food and Nutrition

U.S. cuts to food assistance have hit displaced and conflict-affected populations hard. In Myanmar’s Rakhine State, food rations for 145,000 Rohingya confined in squalid camps were first halved, then cut entirely for many by mid-2025, driving acute hunger.[18] One father, Mohammed Taher, watched helplessly as his two-year-old son grew weak from malnutrition and died after their rations ceased.

“I lost my son because of the funding cuts, and it is not only me — many more children in other camps have also died… from hunger.”

— Mohammed Taher[19]

His tragedy is echoed across Myanmar.[20] Overall, the World Food Programme’s budget for 2025 shrank to $6.4 billion, down 40% from 2024, forcing drastic ration cuts globally.[21] In refugee camps on the Thai–Myanmar border, food distributions have been completely halted for most refugees as of late 2025.[22] Families have been reduced from three meals a day to one, with many surviving on foraged leaves, small river fish, or nothing at all.[23] Malnutrition is spiking, and aid groups warn of looming famine in isolated areas if aid is not restored.[24]

Education and Child Protection

Schools and safe spaces for children have been gutted by the funding freeze. A severe and multi-donor funding crisis forced the closure of more than 6,400 learning centres in Cox’s Bazar — run jointly by UNICEF, Save the Children, and other partners — leaving hundreds of thousands of Rohingya children without education or protective oversight.[25]

• In those camps the impact was immediate: abductions of children quadrupled and recruitment of child soldiers by armed groups jumped eightfold in 2025 as kids were left idle and unprotected.[26]

“If the school hadn’t closed, I wouldn’t be trapped in this life.”

— A 17-year-old Rohingya girl in Cox’s Bazar, forced into marriage when education programs vanished[27]

Across Myanmar’s conflict zones, similar patterns hold: with education programs defunded, millions of children have been out of school, exposed to exploitation. Verified child marriage cases rose 21%, and child labor cases 17% in one year, with the true numbers likely far higher.[28] The collapse of child protection services — from orphanages to psychosocial support — has created a “lost generation” of Myanmar youth scarred by trauma, hunger and lack of education.[29]

Civil Society and Media

The aid cuts delivered a heavy blow to Myanmar’s civil society — often the last line of defense for communities under attack. Pro-democracy groups, local NGOs and independent media outlets have been forced to cease operations or drastically scale back.[30]

Many relied on foreign grants to pay staff and basic costs; with those funds frozen, organizations have laid off workers and shut offices. This has severely impeded human rights monitoring and advocacy: networks that documented military abuses or provided legal aid to political prisoners can no longer function at previous capacity.[31]

“The ripple effects of these cuts are far-reaching, putting thousands of lives in grave danger and severely impeding the ability for pro-democracy and human rights groups to make their voices heard.”

— Benedict Rogers, Senior Director at Fortify Rights[32]

Silencing these local voices has effectively blinded the international community to many ongoing atrocities. Myanmar journalists warn that without outside support, reporting on the junta’s crimes has become nearly impossible — a dangerous information blackout welcomed by the regime. In the words of one human rights defender: “We are worried for our future… many NGOs in Myanmar [have been] destabilized by these cuts.”[33]

Myanmar’s Post-Coup Humanitarian Collapse (2021–2025)

Myanmar’s February 2021 military coup plunged the nation into conflict and humanitarian freefall. Civil war now engulfs large swathes of the country, with over 3.5 million people internally displaced — by some estimates nearly 4 million as of 2025.[34]

Daily life is marked by violence: the junta has carried out hundreds of airstrikes — over 600 in just a four-month span of 2025 — and destroyed more than 100,000 homes, along with schools, clinics and places of worship.[35][36]

The Rohingya Crisis

The Rohingya crisis remains the structural humanitarian fault line underpinning Myanmar’s displacement dynamics and regional politics. Long before the 2021 coup, the systematic persecution and mass expulsion of Rohingya Muslims from Rakhine State had already produced one of the world’s most protracted refugee crises. Since 2017, more than 1 million Rohingya have fled Myanmar, primarily to Bangladesh, where they remain confined to camps in Cox’s Bazar with no legal right to work and near-total dependence on international aid.[37]

Following the 2021 military takeover in Myanmar, conditions for Rohingya who remained inside the country deteriorated further. Movement restrictions, denial of citizenship, and segregation in internment-style camps persisted, while conflict and economic collapse sharply increased humanitarian needs. The Rohingya were thus doubly exposed: excluded from the state by design, and increasingly deprioritized by an international aid system under strain.[38]

The 2025 U.S. aid freeze marked a critical rupture for Rohingya populations on both sides of the border. U.S. funding had underwritten core life-saving services, including food assistance, primary healthcare, nutrition programs, and child protection. When these funds were suspended, the consequences were immediate and lethal.[39]

In Cox’s Bazar, the World Food Programme was forced to halve monthly food rations, reducing assistance to levels insufficient to meet basic caloric needs.[40] Investigative reporting documented deaths from acute malnutrition, including that of a two-year-old child whose family lost food assistance following the cuts.[41] Health workers reported rising cases of wasting among children and pregnant women, alongside clinic closures and medicine shortages.[42] UNICEF simultaneously shuttered thousands of learning centers, leaving hundreds of thousands of Rohingya children without education or protective oversight, contributing to documented spikes in child labor, trafficking, and early marriage.[43]

Inside Myanmar, Rohingya communities in Rakhine State faced an even bleaker reality. With humanitarian access constrained by the military and international funding collapsing, food distributions ceased in multiple camps. Aid organizations warned that entire communities were being pushed toward famine conditions with no viable coping mechanisms.[44] Unlike other displaced groups, Rohingya lacked armed protection, political representation, or viable migration pathways, rendering them uniquely vulnerable to aid withdrawal.[45]

The Earthquake

[Photo: Reuters] Destruction in central Myanmar following the March 2025 earthquake. Source: Reuters.

A catastrophic 7.7-magnitude earthquake in March 2025 compounded the turmoil, killing over 3,600 people — with some estimates placing the toll above 5,000 — and devastating central regions like Mandalay, Sagaing and Magway.[46] In the aftermath, even resistance forces declared brief ceasefires to facilitate relief (though they often broke them).[47] Humanitarian needs only grew: the UN estimates 40% of Myanmar’s population now requires aid.[48]

The Elections

2025 was supposed to bring a return to democracy via elections, but the planned polls in late 2025 are widely viewed as a sham.[49] The regime has banned the main opposition, imprisoned its leaders, and rebranded itself the “National Security and Peace Commission.”[50]

The Rohingya issue has also shaped regional diplomatic behavior toward Myanmar’s junta. Several neighboring states view Rohingya displacement primarily as a cross-border management problem rather than a rights-based crisis. As a result, engagement with Myanmar’s military authorities has increasingly been justified on pragmatic grounds: border stability, refugee containment, and eventual repatriation.[51]

This dynamic has created perverse incentives. Elections organized by the junta, despite lacking credibility, are closely watched by regional actors partly because they are framed as a potential pathway to renewed cooperation on the “refugee issue.” In this context, the suffering of Rohingya populations becomes instrumentalized — used to legitimize engagement with an abusive regime rather than to compel accountability for crimes against humanity.

Case Study: On the Karen Border

[Photo: Anchorage Daily News] A child refugee from Myanmar forages for food near Mae La camp on the Thai–Myanmar border. With formal aid programs halted, many displaced families resort to scavenging to survive.[52]

Along Myanmar’s eastern frontier, the Karen-Thai border region illustrates the humanitarian freefall caused by aid cuts. For decades, this area hosted tens of thousands of Myanmar refugees (largely ethnic Karen, Karenni, and others) in long-established camps like Mae La in Thailand’s Tak province. Many have lived there for generations, fleeing conflict and persecution at home. These communities long depended on international aid — from food rations to healthcare and schooling — much of it funded by the U.S. and other donors. When U.S. funding was frozen in 2025, the effect on the border camps was swift and devastating. International agencies abruptly shut down clinics, schools, and food distribution programs almost overnight.[53]

By mid-2025, food aid to the Thai camps had nearly collapsed. The World Food Programme and NGOs had to cut rations to a minimum, then entirely in some sites, due to funding shortfalls. At Mae La (the largest camp, housing roughly 40,000 refugees), families saw their monthly food allotments dwindle to zero — prompting desperate coping measures. Men and boys venture out of the camps to hunt or fish in unsafe border jungles; women and children forage for wild yams, bamboo shoots, or firewood to sell, risking landmines and arrest.

“The end of food rations for most refugees was just days away [when I visited].”

— Mercy Chriesty Barends, Indonesian MP and head of ASEAN’s human rights caucus[54]

Aid workers on the border report a spike in refugees attempting to cross back into conflict zones in Myanmar (to salvage property or crops) or to migrate onward to Thailand’s cities or Malaysia — often falling prey to human traffickers. The “precariat” of undocumented Myanmar migrants is swelling as a result of the aid vacuum, subject to exploitation in sweatshops or farms with little protection.

A Bright Spot

In mid-2025, Thai authorities granted the right to work to some 80,000 Myanmar refugees in nine official camps.[55] This policy change offers hope that refugees can become more self-sufficient over time. Indeed, many camp residents are eager to work legally and reduce their reliance on handouts. However, with the humanitarian situation so dire, these long-term solutions cannot substitute immediate relief. Refugee advocates stress that without urgent food and medical aid, the coming months will bring “disease and hunger” even if refugees can seek jobs.[56]

The border communities are resilient — churches, community-based organizations, and refugee-led groups are mobilizing what they can — but they cannot possibly meet the enormous needs left by the exit of international aid.[57]

The Road Ahead

As 2026 approaches, Myanmar stands at a crossroads of humanitarian and political emergencies.[58] The end of the junta’s elections will likely change nothing for the better — violence and displacement are expected to continue unabated.[59] In this context, the sudden vacuum of aid is life-threatening for millions of Myanmar’s people.[60] Reversing that collapse will require both restoring aid flows and reimagining aid models that, either way, were never perfect — lest Myanmar’s tragedy become a harbinger of a broader global retreat from our responsibility to protect the most vulnerable.[61]

Any reckoning with Myanmar’s crisis must also confront a deeper myth that runs through much of the international response: the idea that displaced populations like the Rohingya are passive victims, wholly dependent on outside rescue. As Rohingya Refugee News has documented, the Rohingya are not passive actors in their survival. Their flight from Rakhine State was itself an act of agency — a collective decision to resist a genocidal political program by seeking life elsewhere, at extraordinary cost.

In the camps and border regions, communities forced to flee Myanmar communities continue to work, farm, trade and organize, often illegally and at significant risk of reprisal, simply to access the basic rights that the system denies them. The international community, state-level governments, and civil society must find ways to support this resilience — not by restricting access to the rights and reinforcing narratives of helplessness, but by actively reducing the barriers to education, employment, and legal recognition that keep a million people trapped and exploitable.[62]

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Notes

[1] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), “Global Humanitarian Overview 2025: The Cruel Math of Aid Cuts (Hyper-Prioritized Report),” ReliefWeb, June 2025, https://reliefweb.int/report/world/global-humanitarian-overview-2025-cruel-math-aid-cuts-hyper-prioritized-report-june-2025.

[2] Center for Global Development, “USAID’s Role in Global Health Supply Chain Programs and Implications of Aid Cuts: A Rapid Review,” 2025, https://www.cgdev.org/publication/usaids-role-global-health-supply-chain-programs-and-implications-aid-cuts-rapid-review.

[3] UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, “Future International Development Spending Set Out in Spring Statement,” GOV.UK, March 27, 2025, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/future-international-development-spending-set-out-in-spring-statement.

[4] Development Initiatives, Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2025, June 2025, https://reliefweb.int/report/world/global-humanitarian-assistance-report-2025.

[5] Emma Farge, “UN Food and Refugee Agencies Plan Deep Cuts, Internal Memos Show,” Reuters, April 25, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/un-food-refugee-agencies-plan-deep-cuts-internal-memos-show-2025-04-25/.

[6] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), “Global Humanitarian Overview 2025: The Cruel Math of Aid Cuts (Hyper-Prioritized Report).”

[7] Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), “Cuts in Official Development Assistance: OECD Projections for 2025 and the Near Term,” OECD Policy Briefs, no. 26, June 26, 2025, https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/2025/06/cuts-in-official-development-assistance_e161f0c5/full-report.html.

[8] OCHA, “Myanmar: Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan (HNRP) 2024 Funding Status (31 December 2024),” infographic, December 31, 2024, https://www.themimu.info/sites/themimu.info/files/documents/Infographic_HNRP_2024_Funding_Status_OCHA_31Dec2024.pdf.

[9] OCHA, “Myanmar: HNRP 2024 Funding Status — Donor List,” December 31, 2024, https://www.themimu.info/sites/themimu.info/files/documents/Infographic_HNRP_2024_Funding_Status_OCHA_31Dec2024.pdf.

[10] ACAPS, “Myanmar: Implications of the US Funding Freeze and Cuts in the Response and Health Needs,” briefing note, March 2025, https://www.acaps.org/fileadmin/Data_Product/Main_media/20250324_ACAPS_Briefing_note_Myanmar_implications_of_the_US_funding_freeze.pdf.

[11] Maia Davies and Imogen Foulkes, “UN Risks ‘Imminent Financial Collapse’, Secretary General Warns,” BBC News, January 30, 2026, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cr579mdv4m7o.

[12] ACAPS, “Myanmar: Implications of the US Funding Freeze and Cuts in the Response and Health Needs.”

[13] Humanitarian Aid Relief Trust (HART) and Fortify Rights, “Trump’s Aid Cuts Have ‘Strengthened Tyranny’ in Myanmar, Human Rights Groups Warn,” joint news release, August 14, 2025, https://www.fortifyrights.org/mya-inv-2025-08-14/.

[14] Amnesty International, “Myanmar: Recklessly Abrupt US Aid Stoppage Poses Existential Threat to Human Rights,” February 13, 2025, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/02/myanmar-recklessly-abrupt-us-aid-stoppage-poses-existential-threat-to-human-rights/.

[15] Center for Global Development, “USAID’s Role in Global Health Supply Chain Programs and Implications of Aid Cuts: A Rapid Review.”

[16] Olivia Le Poidevin, “US Aid Cuts to Myanmar Are Having Catastrophic Impact, UN Rapporteur Says,” Reuters, March 17, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/us-aid-cuts-myanmar-are-having-catastrophic-impact-un-says-2025-03-17/.

[17] Amnesty International, “Myanmar: Recklessly Abrupt US Aid Stoppage Poses Existential Threat to Human Rights.”

[18] Kristen Gelineau, “Starving Children Screaming for Food as US Aid Cuts Unleash Devastation and Death across Myanmar,” Associated Press, October 8, 2025, https://apnews.com/article/7f6919a1863ceea2ddf6708e47bb88f0.

[19] Ibid.

[20] “UN’s Food Agency WFP to Cut Aid for about a Million People in Myanmar,” Reuters, March 14, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/uns-food-agency-wfp-cut-aid-about-million-myanmar-2025-03-14/.

[21] World Food Programme, “WFP Faces Steep Funding Cuts in 2025,” 2025, https://www.wfp.org/stories/wfp-faces-steep-funding-cuts-2025.

[22] Kristen Gelineau, “Starving Children Screaming for Food as US Aid Cuts Unleash Devastation and Death across Myanmar.”

[23] Ibid.

[24] “UN’s Food Agency WFP to Cut Aid for about a Million People in Myanmar.”

[25] “Takeaways from the AP’s Reporting on the Escalating Rohingya Refugee Crisis,” Associated Press, December 16, 2025, https://apnews.com/article/usaid-rohingya-exploitation-trump-budget-cuts-takeaways-b87e5175ea38b7905941c05e4c7f8353.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Development Initiatives, Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2025.

[30] Humanitarian Aid Relief Trust (HART) and Fortify Rights, “Trump’s Aid Cuts Have ‘Strengthened Tyranny’ in Myanmar, Human Rights Groups Warn.”

[31] Ibid.

[32] Benedict Rogers, “Myanmar’s Most Vulnerable Are Being Starved by Global Aid Cuts,” Fortify Rights, September 2, 2025, https://www.fortifyrights.org/mya-inv-oped-2025-09-02/.

[33] Humanitarian Aid Relief Trust (HART) and Fortify Rights, “Trump’s Aid Cuts Have ‘Strengthened Tyranny’ in Myanmar, Human Rights Groups Warn.”

[34] OCHA, “Myanmar Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2025,” December 13, 2024; and OHCHR, “A/HRC/59/57: Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar,” May 26, 2025, https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/myanmar/myanmar-humanitarian-needs-and-response-plan-2025-december-2024.

[35] Benedict Rogers, “Myanmar’s Most Vulnerable Are Being Starved by Global Aid Cuts.”

[36] United Nations General Assembly, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar,” A/80/490, October 20, 2025, https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/myanmar/a-80-490-auv-en.pdf.

[37] UNHCR, “Rohingya Emergency”; DFAT, “Rohingya Refugee Crisis”; IRC, “The Rohingya Crisis, Explained,” https://www.unhcr.org/emergencies/rohingya-emergency.

[38] Ibid.

[39] “Takeaways from the AP’s Reporting on the Escalating Rohingya Refugee Crisis.”

[40] “UN Food Agency Seeks Urgent Funding to Avoid Aid Cuts to Rohingya,” Reuters, March 7, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/un-food-agency-seeks-urgent-funding-avoid-aid-cuts-rohingya-2025-03-07/.

[41] “Takeaways from the AP’s Reporting on the Escalating Rohingya Refugee Crisis.”

[42] Ibid.

[43] Ibid.

[44] “UN’s Food Agency WFP to Cut Aid for about a Million People in Myanmar.”

[45] UNHCR, “Rohingya Emergency”; DFAT, “Rohingya Refugee Crisis”; IRC, “The Rohingya Crisis, Explained.”

[46] “UN Warns Window to Find Myanmar Quake Survivors Closing, Death Toll Climbs towards 3,000,” Reuters, April 1, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/business/environment/survivors-myanmar-quake-left-without-food-water-shelter-aid-groups-say-2025-04-01/. Note: headline reflects early-stage reporting. The military government’s subsequent figure was 3,770 dead; independent tallies range from 4,549 (DVB) to 5,352 (Mizzima).

[47] Sascha Matuszak, “In Earthquake’s Aftermath, Major Myanmar Rebel Alliance Announces Humanitarian Pause,” The Diplomat, April 3, 2025, https://thediplomat.com/2025/04/in-earthquakes-aftermath-major-myanmar-rebel-alliance-announces-humanitarian-pause/.

[48] OCHA, “Myanmar Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2025.”

[49] Reuters, “Myanmar Goes to the Polls amid Civil War and Humanitarian Crisis,” December 27, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/myanmar-goes-polls-amid-civil-war-humanitarian-crisis-2025-12-27/.

[50] Associated Press, “Myanmar ends state of emergency and its military leader switches roles to prepare for the vote,” July 31, 2025; and ICNL, “Myanmar Civic Freedom Monitor,” https://apnews.com/article/myanmar-politics-election-government-min-aung-hlaing-cf6e7ff92cc92a134c9592ad39e62770.

[51] UNHCR, “Rohingya Emergency”; DFAT, “Rohingya Refugee Crisis”; IRC, “The Rohingya Crisis, Explained.”

[52] Kristen Gelineau, “Starving Children Screaming for Food as US Aid Cuts Unleash Devastation and Death across Myanmar.”

[53] Ibid.

[54] Ibid.

[55] Human Rights Watch, “Thailand: Let Myanmar Refugees Work Legally,” August 26, 2025; Reuters, “Thailand Grants Some Myanmar Refugees Right to Legal Work,” August 27, 2025, https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/08/27/thailand-allows-myanmar-refugees-in-camps-to-work-legally.

[56] Humanitarian Aid Relief Trust (HART) and Fortify Rights, “Trump’s Aid Cuts Have ‘Strengthened Tyranny’ in Myanmar, Human Rights Groups Warn.”

[57] Kristen Gelineau, “Starving Children Screaming for Food as US Aid Cuts Unleash Devastation and Death across Myanmar.”

[58] OCHA, “Myanmar Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2025.”

[59] Reuters, “Myanmar Goes to the Polls amid Civil War and Humanitarian Crisis.”

[60] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), “Global Humanitarian Overview 2025: The Cruel Math of Aid Cuts (Hyper-Prioritized Report).”

[61] Ibid.

[62] Rohingya Refugee News, “Orlando Bloom in Rohingya Camps,” https://www.rohingyarefugee.news/p/orland-bloom-in-rohingya-camps.

This piece draws on reporting by Reuters, the Associated Press, OCHA, ACAPS, UNICEF, Save the Children, Human Rights Watch, Fortify Rights, and Rohingya Refugee News. All footnotes link to primary or original sources.

Humanitarian crises fade from headlines, but the people affected continue living with their consequences. In northeastern Nigeria, displacement that began in 2009 has become a permanent state for millions. This report examines the basic challenges of survival in IDP camps: access to food, healthcare, and protection. It’s the first in a series that will explore why, after fifteen years, conditions continue to deteriorate rather than improve

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Understanding the Crisis Context

Nigeria has faced ongoing mass displacement in the north-eastern region since 2009. Overlapping crises, in particular violence driven by non-state armed groups (NSAGs) such as Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province, combined with climate change-induced extreme weather, are the leading causes of internal displacement in Nigeria.[1]

Boko Haram, whose name translates to “Western education is forbidden” in the Hausa language, is an extremist jihadist organization with the primary goal of violently overthrowing the secular Nigerian government. They aim to establish a state governed by their strict interpretation of Sharia law, which they view as uncorrupted.[3] The group’s violent activities target civilians, security forces, and institutions associated with Western influence, causing widespread fear and suffering. The conflict has regional dimensions and is spilling over into neighboring countries such as Cameroon, Chad and Niger.[2]

The Nigerian government established multiple camps for Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) designed to provide temporary shelter, safety and essential services, including food and healthcare. IDP numbers increased from around 100,000 in 2009 to over 2 million by 2015, peaking at 3.6 million in 2021, and remaining at 3.36 million in 2025.[4] The BAY states (Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe) host the majority of the displaced, with Borno alone accounting for 1.7 million IDPs in 2025.[5]

Drivers of Displacement: Conflict and Climate

The main cause of the large-scale displacement crisis in North-Eastern Nigeria is the prolonged and brutal insurgency led by Boko Haram and other non-state armed groups. These challenges are exacerbated by environmental issues and natural disasters like severe seasonal flooding, which devastate communities and infrastructure every year, making the situation even more dire for those who have been displaced.[6] Additionally, the impacts of climate change, such as the shrinking of Lake Chad and resulting resource shortages, escalate conflicts over limited resources, perpetuating the cycle of displacement in the region.[7]

According to the National Bureau of Statistics (2024), the top five challenges experienced by IDPs in northeastern Nigeria are related to health, food and infrastructure.[8] These necessities are a right for every Nigerian citizen. The data shows an astonishing amount of people without adequate health services, food, power and clothing, with only about a tenth of displaced persons having adequate services provided.

This report examines food insecurity, malnutrition, and healthcare infrastructure in IDP camps, focusing on Nigeria’s north-eastern region, which has had the largest displaced population from 2009 to 2025. This report serves as an introduction to a comprehensive series that will further explore the multifaceted challenges facing displaced populations in northeastern Nigeria.

Food Access and Availability in IDP Camps

Due to the crisis and disasters that have plagued the north-eastern part of Nigeria, limited agricultural activities, insufficient support and harsh living conditions have intensified food shortages in many IDP camps, leaving many IDPs reliant on inconsistent food aid.[9] As a result, the food inflation rate increased by 39% in 2024.[10] The production of notable foods, such as maize and rice, declined by 30.1% and 25%, respectively.[11] With a growing population, such declining production rates are insufficient to feed the nation, much less the IDP camps, which have faced neglect.

Nigeria, as of 2024, has the highest number of people facing acute food insecurity in the world, with 31.8 million, which is 24.22% more than the second highest, Sudan (25.6 million). From 2016 to 2019, the number declined to its lowest ever figure of 5 million, but then rose the following year by nearly double, reaching its worst recorded number in 2024.[12]

Child Malnutrition: Rising SAM Cases

Rates of malnutrition, particularly severe acute malnutrition (SAM) among children under five, have consistently risen in the BAY states. Early in the decade, stunting rates for children in the northeast were approximately 40%.[13] Malnutrition in Nigerian IDP camps has affected all demographics, including men, women and children, and common forms of malnutrition include wasting, underweight and overweight.[14] Research has identified that 89.9% of males and 88.5% of females were underweight.

Annual estimates indicate that SAM cases in the BAY states doubled from 200,000 in 2015 to 400,000 by 2020 and then accelerated to 1 million in 2025, with some projections estimating as many as 1.8 million cases.[15] In 2018, acute malnutrition contributed to nearly half a million child deaths.[16] Causal factors identified include inadequate sanitation, hygiene, and poverty. Poverty was identified by 100% of respondents in research as the primary cause of malnutrition. Other causes include the quality and quantity of food and water sources.

Healthcare Access: Declining Facilities and Services

Healthcare provision in IDP camps has declined due to conflict and underfunding. In 2010, facilities were intact but overwhelmed. By 2025, 31% of health facilities were out of operation in the BAY crisis context, implying 69% operational.[17]

Annual data is limited, but conflict and floods have strained resources, with poor sanitation exacerbating risks. Funding deficits have led to reductions in 70% of essential health services in 2025, resulting in renewed outbreaks in certain areas.[18]

Safety and Protection in Displacement

Gender-Based Violence

Gender-based violence (GBV) remains one of the most critical protection challenges in northeastern Nigeria’s IDP camps. The conflict environment and displacement have created conditions that exacerbate vulnerabilities, particularly for women and girls. Sexual violence, intimate partner violence, forced marriage, and sexual exploitation have been widely reported across IDP camps and host communities.[19]

The breakdown of traditional community protection mechanisms, overcrowding in camps, inadequate lighting, and lack of private facilities create environments where GBV flourishes. Women and girls face threats both from within their communities and from armed actors. Research has identified a correlation between the Boko Haram conflict and increased rates of intimate partner violence, as displacement disrupts traditional gender roles and economic stability, leading to heightened household tensions.[20]

Service provision for GBV survivors remains inadequate across the BAY states. While some humanitarian organizations provide psychosocial support, clinical management of rape, and legal assistance, gaps in coverage are significant. Many survivors face stigmatization that prevents them from seeking help, and limited confidential reporting mechanisms further restrict access to services.[21] The integration of GBV prevention and response into all humanitarian programming remains insufficient despite growing recognition of its importance.

Child Protection

Children represent more than half of the displaced population in northeastern Nigeria and face particular vulnerabilities. Beyond malnutrition and disease, children in IDP camps confront risks including family separation, recruitment by armed groups, child labor, child marriage, and psychosocial trauma.[22]

The kidnapping of hundreds of schoolchildren by Boko Haram, most notably the 276 Chibok schoolgirls in 2014 and 110 Dapchi schoolgirls in 2018, highlighted the extreme protection risks children face in the conflict zone.[23] Many kidnapped children experienced sexual violence, forced marriage, forced labor, and indoctrination. Of the Chibok girls, 112 remain missing as of 2025, and those who returned face ongoing challenges including stigmatization, trauma, and children born from rape.[24]

Family separation during displacement leaves children vulnerable to exploitation and abuse. Children associated with armed groups, whether through forced recruitment or birth to parents affiliated with Boko Haram, face particular stigmatization and protection challenges. The lack of birth registration and documentation for children born in displacement creates long-term protection and citizenship concerns.[25]

Access to education in IDP camps remains limited, with only a fraction of displaced children enrolled in formal or informal learning programs. This educational gap not only affects children’s development but also increases their vulnerability to recruitment and exploitation. Child protection services, including family tracing and reunification, psychosocial support, and case management, remain severely underfunded and unable to meet the scale of need.[26]

Funding and Response Challenges

Resource mobilization for IDP health, safety, and protection has not kept pace with growing needs. Humanitarian response plans launched in 2015 with $100 million projected needs but secured only half that sum, and annual funding gaps have persisted and widened.[27]

Especially stark was 2025: with more than $910 million required, only $249 million had been raised as of October 2025, leaving key relief programs severely under-resourced.[28] Food and health services have faced structural reductions, worsened by the partial suspension of foreign aid since 2022.[29]

The protection sector, which includes GBV prevention and response as well as child protection programming, has been particularly affected by funding shortfalls. The 2025 humanitarian needs and response plan identified protection as a critical priority, yet funding gaps have forced service reductions across multiple areas.[30]

Where This Series Goes From Here

Between 2010 and 2025, Nigeria’s IDP camps saw worsening food insecurity, rates of severe malnutrition that doubled or potentially tripled, close to a third of healthcare facilities rendered non-operational, and severe protection challenges affecting the most vulnerable populations.[31] The ongoing underfunding crisis, exemplified by the $661 million funding gap in 2025, highlights the urgent need for financial investment, infrastructure improvement and sustainable solutions that address the root causes of displacement.

The humanitarian crisis in Nigeria’s IDP camps represents a profound violation of fundamental human rights—the right to food, health, safety, and protection enshrined in international law and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Women and children bear a disproportionate burden of this crisis, facing heightened risks of violence, exploitation, and deprivation. Addressing this crisis requires coordinated, principled action from multiple actors grounded in human rights obligations and refugee protection standards.

This report serves as the foundation for an ongoing series examining the health and safety challenges in northeastern Nigeria’s IDP camps. Future reports in this series will provide deeper analysis of specific issues including:

• Detailed examination of healthcare service delivery models and gaps in IDP settings

• Comprehensive assessment of water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) infrastructure and its health impacts

• Analysis of mental health and psychosocial support needs and interventions

The complexity and scale of the northeastern Nigeria crisis demand sustained attention, comprehensive research, and evidence-based policy recommendations. Only through continued documentation, analysis, and advocacy can the international community and Nigerian government develop effective responses that uphold the dignity and rights of displaced populations while working toward lasting peace and security in the region.

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ENDNOTES

[1] Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), “Country Profile Nigeria,” accessed 2025, https://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/nigeria/.

[2] Sida, “Nigeria Humanitarian Country Analysis,” 2025, https://cdn.sida.se/app/uploads/2021/04/15111010/Nigeria-HCA-2025.pdf.

[3] D. Amoke, “Internal Displacement in Northeastern Nigeria: Causes, Consequences and Remedies,” International Journal of Multidisciplinary Studies in Social Sciences, Professional and Contemporary Studies 7, no. 1 (2023): 1-17; National Counterterrorism Center, “Boko Haram,” 2016; Brookings Institution, “From ‘Western education is forbidden’ to the world’s deadliest terrorist group: Education and Boko Haram in Nigeria,” 2020.

[4] IDMC, “Country Profile Nigeria”; International Organization for Migration (IOM), “Nigeria Displacement Tracking Matrix: 2025 Report,” accessed 2025, https://dtm.iom.int/nigeria.

[5] IOM, “Nigeria Displacement Tracking Matrix: 2025 Report.”

[6] A. Bilak, “North-east Nigeria: A Massive Internal Displacement Crisis,” ArcGIS StoryMaps, 2019; International Organization for Migration (IOM), Over 15000 Internally Displaced Persons in Immediate Need of Shelter as Flood Ravages Camps in Northeast Nigeria (IOM, 2022).

[7] A. M. Mohammed et al., “Insecurity, Resource Scarcity, and Migration to Camps of Internally Displaced Persons in Northeast Nigeria,” Sustainability 12, no. 17 (2020): 6830.

[8] National Bureau of Statistics, Report of Internally Displaced Persons (Abuja: National Bureau of Statistics, 2024).

[9] Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Food Security and Nutrition Assessment in Conflict-Afflicted Areas of Nigeria (FAO, 2023).

[10] Nigerian Economic Summit Group (NESG), Collaborative Action for Growth (Abuja: NESG, 2024).

[11] M. U. Ikobah, A. B. Jibrila, and S. Adejoh, “Nigeria’s Internal Security-Food Security,” Izu: Journal of Critical Perspectives 3, no. 1 (2025): 42-55.

[12] Food Security Information Network (FSIN) and Global Network Against Food Crisis (GNAFC), Global Report on Food Crises (Rome: FSIN and GNAFC, 2025).

[13] UNICEF, Humanitarian Action for Children Nigeria (UNICEF, 2025).

[14] C. G. Ajuru et al., “Prevalence of Malnutrition, Causal Factors of Malnutrition and Other Risk Factors in Nigeria Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) Camps,” Global Health Dynamics 1, no. 4 (2025): 20-30.

[15] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Nigeria 2025 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan (OCHA, 2025); ReliefWeb, “Nigeria: One Million More Children Expected to Suffer Acute Malnutrition in 2025 as Hunger Crisis Deepens,” April 2025, https://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/nigeria-one-million-more-children-expected-suffer-acute-malnutrition-2025-hunger-crisis-deepens.

[16] World Health Organization (WHO), Nigeria: Nutrition Crisis Report (WHO, 2018).

[17] OCHA, Nigeria 2025 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan.

[18] Amnesty International, “Nigeria Faces Humanitarian Crisis Amid Violence and Mass Displacement,” 2025, https://www.jurist.org/news/2025/07/nigeria-faces-humanitarian-crisis-amid-violence-and-mass-displacement/.

[19] Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC), “Gender-Based Violence in Northern Nigeria: A Review of Activities, Progress and Gaps,” accessed 2025, https://cfidtaraba.org/gender-based-violence-in-northern-nigeria-a-review-of-activities-progress-and-gaps/; Global Protection Cluster, Protection Sector Northeast Nigeria 2024 Annual Report (Global Protection Cluster, 2025), https://globalprotectioncluster.org/sites/default/files/2025-03/psne_2024_annual_report.pdf.

[20] Eseosa Ughwanogho et al., Effect of Armed Conflict on Intimate Partner Violence: Evidence from the Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria (World Bank, 2020), http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/807641583160047607/pdf/Effect-of-Armed-Conflict-on-Intimate-Partner-Violence-Evidence-from-the-Boko-Haram-Insurgency-in-Nigeria.pdf.

[21] CIVIC, “Gender-Based Violence in Northern Nigeria.”

[22] Humanitarian Action, “Child Protection AOR,” accessed 2025, https://humanitarianaction.info/plan/1274/article/392-child-protection-aor.

[23] O. N. Awojobi, “The Socio-Economic Implications of Boko Haram Insurgency in the North-East of Nigeria,” International Journal of Innovative Social Sciences Research 2, no. 4 (October 2014): 144-150.

[24] D. Searcey, “Why the Chibok Girls Returned by Boko Haram Are Still Not Entirely Free,” The Independent, May 1, 2018, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/long_reads/boko-haram-girls-kidnapped-freed-return-nigeria-campus-children-babies-a8307866.html; Bring Back Our Girls Campaign, accessed 2025,

https://bringbackourgirls.ng/

[25] Global Protection Cluster, Protection Sector Northeast Nigeria 2024 Annual Report.

[26] Humanitarian Action, “Child Protection AOR.”

[27] OCHA, “Nigeria: Humanitarian Funding Trends 2015-2023,” accessed 2023, https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/nigeria/.

[28] Humanitarian Action, “Global Humanitarian Overview: Nigeria,” 2024, https://humanitarianaction.info/article/nigeria-2.

[29] World Food Programme (WFP), “Nigeria: Food Security and Humanitarian Update,” 2025, https://www.wfp.org/countries/nigeria.

[30] Global Protection Cluster, Protection Sector Northeast Nigeria 2024 Annual Report.

[31] OCHA, Nigeria 2025 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan; A. A. Akinwumi, “Cholera in Nigeria: A Five-Decade Review of Outbreak Dynamics and Health System Responses,” accessed 2025, https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC12482021/.

The Human Rights of Refugees

Theoretical Foundations and Practical Failures

The concept of human rights asks difficult questions about values at the intersection of ethics, political philosophy, international law and other overlapping social, cultural, economic, and political phenomena. An effective human rights paradigm requires an intentional investigation of moral values, guided by social justice imperatives. These values must reflect the availability of resources to shape implementations that are critical to realizing our understanding of rights.

Rights must be grounded in a sound understanding of morality and realized through functioning sociopolitical and legal instruments. Human rights expanded in scope and implementation for decades leading up to the 21st century. Today, the vast defunding of the UNHCR and backsliding of international commitment to human rights and particularly the human rights of refugees and migrants demonstrates how challenging it has been to forward the cause of human rights.

Although human rights have become ubiquitous with our sense of collective morality, for many of the world’s poorest and most vulnerable, rights exist only in theory rather than in practice. Data collected in 2011 showed that 71% of the global population lived on less than $10.00 a day.¹ Ten years later, by 2021, because of the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, much of the gain towards eradicating the most extreme levels of poverty has been erased.² Yet, the disproportionately wealthiest nations of the world, which have embraced the concept of human rights for decades and have the material wealth to end extreme poverty, have not been morally or politically motivated to do so.³

The gross denial of the rights of displaced people represents perhaps one of the most significant failures in the implementation of the human rights regime. While most governments are party to the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol, refugees and asylum seekers are routinely denied entry at fortress-like borders, indefinitely detained, tortured and sexually abused, denied freedom of movement, and the enjoyment of the most basic rights such as employment and education.⁴ While the rights of displaced people vary depending on their legal classification as internally displaced, refugees, or asylum seekers from the moral standpoint on which the human rights regime is founded, there is a clear responsibility to support the vulnerable which has not translated into effective policy or protection.

Legal Classifications and Protection Gaps

The rights guaranteed to displaced people in the current international legal system vary considerably based on how migrants are legally classified. There is no global legal instrument that protects internally displaced people. The African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons, negotiated in 2009 and 2012, is an important regional and legally binding agreement on IDPs because more than a third of IDPs are in Sub-Saharan Africa.⁵ The United Nations’ Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement provide national governments with a normative framework for addressing the crisis of internal displacement that includes recommendations for ensuring the human rights of IDPs, but it is not a legally binding convention.

According to the UN, the responsibility to provide for IDPs lies first with individual states, with support from the international community, but the details and obligations of that support are unclear. The most important right guaranteed by law to displaced persons who have crossed an international border is stated in Article 33 of the 1951 Convention protecting refugees from nonrefoulement.⁶ This critical provision applies to all refugees within a country regardless of whether they have arrived legally or through irregular means and ensures protection from being returned to anywhere their life or freedom is under threat. While the nonrefoulement provision has acted as a de facto right to asylum, many countries detain asylum seekers in harsh settings, sometimes indefinitely, to deter them from continuing the long, arduous legal process of seeking permanent asylum.

The practice of restricting the movement of asylum seekers and refugees in camps or detention centers is at the core of the refugee response system. Many displaced persons who are placed in both detention centers and camps will spend years and sometimes decades languishing in a setting in which they are denied many of their basic rights with little hope of returning to their country of origin or accessing dignified resettlement. Crucially, even when displaced persons meet the narrow legal definition of a refugee, it does not automatically confer legal residency or access to work, social services, education or other important needs. Instead, refugee rights recognized by international law are implemented haphazardly, depending on the refugee policies of host countries.

Contemporary Displacement Crises

The Sudanese Crisis: Conflict and Mass Displacement

Sudan’s ongoing conflict is currently one of the world’s most severe contemporary displacement crises. Since fighting erupted in April 2023, the conflict has generated massive internal displacement and cross-border refugee flows affecting multiple countries in the region.⁷ The UNHCR estimates that at least 13 million people have been displaced by the civil conflict, representing one of the fastest growing displacement events in the world today. The Sudanese crisis demonstrates how modern conflicts create complex displacement patterns that overwhelm existing systems designed for more limited, temporary emergencies.

Chad, South Sudan, Egypt, and the Central African Republic have absorbed substantial refugee populations, with Chad hosting over 1.5 million Sudanese refugees while simultaneously managing its own internal fragility.⁸ The international response has struggled to keep pace with the scale and complexity of needs, highlighting the gap between emergency humanitarian assistance and long-term protection frameworks. UNHCR’s 2025 Sudan Regional Refugee Response Plan requested $1.51 billion but remained critically underfunded at only 27% of requirements as of mid-2025, leaving millions without adequate access to food, water, shelter, healthcare, or protection services.⁹

Palestinian Displacement: Protracted Crisis and Legal Gaps

The full-scale invasion of Gaza in late 2023 has brought devastating consequences to multi-generationally displaced communities. As many as 1.9 million people have been displaced by the ongoing assault.¹⁰ The suffering of prolonged displacement in the Gaza Strip has been exacerbated by war and the limited viability of competing protection frameworks. According to the World Bank, the widespread destruction of residential buildings, schools, hospitals, and vital infrastructure combined with an 86% economic contraction in the first quarter of 2024—the largest documented economic contraction on record—has created conditions of humanitarian catastrophe.¹¹

The ongoing crisis has generated new waves of internal displacement within an already heavily displaced population. Palestinian refugees fall under UNRWA’s mandate rather than UNHCR’s jurisdiction, creating a parallel protection system that, while designed to provide essential services to Palestinian refugees across the region, also contributes to fragmentation in the international protection regime. The existing legal framework designed to address the repeated displacement and prolonged exile of Gazans has had negligible impact on the international response to Israel’s invasion of Gaza, demonstrating how protection frameworks can fail to translate into actual protection when political will is absent.¹²

Venezuelan Migration: Regional Response to Economic Collapse

The Venezuelan migration crisis represents the largest displacement crisis in the Western Hemisphere, with over 7.9 million Venezuelans having left their country due to economic collapse, political persecution, and social breakdown.¹³ Economic factors intersect with persecution and political instability to create displacement that challenges traditional refugee definitions. Many Venezuelan migrants do not meet the strict persecution requirements of the 1951 Convention, yet they face serious threats to their lives and wellbeing as hyperinflation, food and medicine shortages, and state repression have rendered life untenable.

Regional responses have varied significantly, demonstrating the inconsistent application of protection principles across different contexts. Colombia has provided temporary protection status to over 2.5 million Venezuelan migrants through its innovative Temporary Protection Status (TPS) program, granting legal status and access to basic services.¹⁴ Brazil adopted a humanitarian visa approach, allowing Venezuelans to regularize their status and access integration programs. Peru initially provided humanitarian visas but later imposed more restrictive entry requirements, including passport and visa mandates that excluded many vulnerable migrants.¹⁵ Chile implemented strict new visa requirements that significantly reduced regular entry pathways.¹⁶ These divergent approaches illustrate that even within a single region facing the same displacement crisis, host country responses range from generous protection to exclusionary policies, leaving migrants’ rights dependent on geography rather than need. The absence of a binding regional framework with clear protection standards and responsibility-sharing mechanisms has meant that neighboring countries bear vastly unequal burdens while displaced Venezuelans experience radically different protection outcomes based solely on which border they cross.

The Reality of Refugee Life: Camps, Detention, Exclusion

Many of the systems designed to support refugees are emergency responses to a crisis. These systems are not practically designed to reintegrate a displaced population into some semblance of normal life or provide them with the tools to restore their autonomy. A shift occurred in the 1980s to encampment as the primary response to displacement wherein the social and economic rights that exist in the 1951 Refugee Convention were largely ignored as camps transformed into spaces of containment.¹⁷

Today, a significant shift‌ is occurring in refugee settlement patterns as displaced populations increasingly avoid encampment and pursue self-resettlement in urban areas to escape the restrictions and confinement characteristic of camp settings. While urban self-settlement may create greater opportunities for refugees to participate in formal and informal economic activities and other vital resources, it simultaneously generates distinct vulnerabilities, including heightened risks of human trafficking, labor exploitation, detention, and refoulement.¹⁸

The urban context presents unique challenges for humanitarian responses that have traditionally struggled to adapt to the complexity of cities.¹⁹ Urban refugees face systematic exclusion driven by multiple intersecting factors including their dispersed and often invisible nature across sprawling metropolitan areas, restrictive legal frameworks that condition rights on residence documentation, barriers to accessing services due to transportation costs and geographical distance from service provision centers, and discrimination in both formal and informal labor markets.²⁰

The Overseas Development Institute’s comprehensive study of urban refugee displacement in Jordan found that refugees living outside camps experienced systematic marginalization: they were more difficult for humanitarian actors to identify and reach compared to camp populations, faced greater legal precariousness particularly regarding residence permits and freedom of movement, encountered discrimination in accessing public services including healthcare and education, and experienced social exclusion manifested through limited integration into host communities and restricted access to urban public spaces.²¹

Moreover, the humanitarian sector’s failure to adequately adjust its traditional sector-based programming approach to the complex, interconnected nature of urban systems has perpetuated exclusion, with inadequate individual targeting mechanisms, insufficient community engagement, and limited accountability to urban-based displaced populations allowing vulnerable individuals to fall through gaps in service provision.²² The urban displacement response demands fundamentally different approaches including area-based programming that considers spatial dynamics and existing municipal infrastructure, partnerships with local governments and civil society organizations possessing contextual knowledge, and recognition that urban refugees’ needs intersect across multiple sectors in ways that cannot be addressed through fragmented humanitarian silos.²³

The denial of work, education, and free movement for displaced people casts doubt on the human rights regime’s actual value. The failure of human rights to substantially improve the quality of life for the majority of the world’s most vulnerable people is a result of the human rights regime’s fundamentally individualistic and inward-looking nature.²⁴ A paradigm shift that emphasizes collective rights and responsibilities may create the requisite motivation to better structure the global refugee regime and more effectively implement its functions.

Recommendations

Reimagining Human Rights: From Individual to Collective Responsibility

The current human rights regime is deeply rooted in the Western philosophical tradition with significant contributions from thinkers like Immanuel Kant and John Locke, who emphasized the importance of the individual’s rights in society.²⁵ At its core, the human rights paradigm seeks to establish a minimum level of protection and assurances to the individual that enable them to exist freely within a social construct that supports their well-being and goals so long as they do not endanger others. Historically, this conceptualization of human rights contributed to the emergence of democracy and built the foundation for a range of social movements that sought the right to self-determination and equal protection under the law.

However, this hyper-individualistic conceptualization of human rights does not provide sufficient motivation or obligation to further the human rights of others and particularly outgroups at the nation-state level.²⁶ As a result, the wealthiest states in the global system despite championing the ideals that underscore the human rights of the individual and using rights as a pretext for limited kinds of intervention, have little incentive to invest the necessary resources to raise the standard of living for the people in the poorest nations. There is a wealth of data that illustrates how poverty, human insecurity, and conflict affect the vulnerable.

The 123 million currently displaced people are perhaps among the most exposed to the most dangerous effects of destitution, which include a litany of human rights abuses. Equal to the data demonstrating the consequences of insecurity are prescriptive strategies underscored by the values of human rights that come from think tanks, IGOs, NGOs, and nation states, yet as the record-breaking displacement numbers suggest, these plans are not being implemented.

Practical Reforms for the 21st Century

Without the social and political will that corresponds to an adequate level of economic support, the number of displaced people will not be reduced and is likely to grow as the world struggles to address the fallout from climate change and ongoing conflicts. Our understanding of what constitutes human rights must shift from a hyper-individualistic conceptualization of rights to a more collectivist perspective that not only motivates nation-states to practice collective responsibility but also obligates them to do so and incentivizes those who do.

Immediate Priorities for Donor States

First, wealthy donor states must reverse the defunding of humanitarian aid, development programs, and support for displaced populations. Current budget cuts to the UNHCR and related agencies undermine the international community’s capacity to respond to unprecedented need at precisely the moment when displacement has reached historic levels. The United States’ withdrawal of billions in funding from UN agencies in 2025, combined with reduced contributions from other major donors, has created operational crises across the humanitarian system that directly translate into reduced protection, inadequate shelter, insufficient food assistance, and curtailed healthcare for millions of displaced persons.²⁷

Donor states should restore and increase funding commitments to ensure that intergovernmental organizations such as the UNHCR, International Organization for Migration, and their local partners can adequately meet the needs of the communities they serve. The chronic gap between humanitarian appeals and actual funding, with Sudan’s response plan funded at only 27% of requirements, demonstrates that the current voluntary contribution model fails to match resources to need.²⁸ Establishing multi-year funding commitments rather than annual appropriations would enable more effective planning and program implementation for protracted displacement situations, which now constitute the majority of displacement contexts globally.

Regional Organizations and Strengthened Cooperation

Second, strengthening multilateral cooperation through regional organizations represents a more effective way forward for addressing region-specific displacement challenges. Regional organizations possess contextual knowledge and political legitimacy that global institutions often lack. Organizations such as the European Union, East African Community, Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) should develop coordinated regional protection frameworks that can respond more rapidly and appropriately to displacement within their regions.

The divergent responses to Venezuelan displacement across Latin America demonstrate both the potential and limitations of regional approaches. While some countries like Colombia implemented generous temporary protection mechanisms, others imposed restrictive policies that left many Venezuelans without legal status or access to basic rights.²⁹ A binding regional framework with clear protection standards and responsibility-sharing mechanisms could ensure more consistent protection outcomes and distribute hosting responsibilities more equitably among neighboring states. Regional responsibility-sharing mechanisms should be bolstered to distribute the burden of hosting displaced populations more equitably, particularly when fragile states face disproportionate refugee inflows, as seen in Chad’s absorption of over 1.5 million Sudanese refugees despite its own institutional constraints.³⁰

Global Intergovernmental Reform

Third, comprehensive reform of the international legal framework governing displacement requires updating instruments conceived in the post-WWII context to address 21st century realities. The UN and member states should draft a contemporary protocol to the 1951 Convention that expands the definition of refugees to include those fleeing gang violence, domestic violence, persecution based on sexual identity and gender, and life-threatening climate change impacts. The current persecution-based definition excludes millions facing equivalent dangers, such as displaced Venezuelans fleeing economic collapse and climate-displaced communities fleeing environmental disaster.³¹

A binding international convention for the protection of internally displaced persons must be established that clarifies state obligations and provides enforcement mechanisms. The current reliance on non-binding guiding principles leaves 83 million IDPs without adequate legal protection.³² The African Union’s Kampala Convention, which entered into force in 2012, provides a regional model that could inform global efforts, establishing legally binding obligations for states to protect and assist IDPs.³³

Clear, enforceable obligations for wealthy states to contribute financial and technical support for the refugee system should be codified. Current voluntary contribution models produce chronic underfunding and operational instability that leave humanitarian operations perpetually under-resourced. A reformed system might include mandatory assessed contributions based on GDP and population, similar to core UN budget assessments, ensuring predictable, adequate funding that matches the scale of global displacement.

Finally, legal pathways for climate-induced displacement must be developed that recognize environmental threats as legitimate grounds for international protection. As climate impacts intensify and are projected to displace between 25 million and 1.2 billion people by 2050, the absence of protection frameworks for climate displacement represents an expanding legal gap that will leave hundreds of millions without adequate protection.³⁴ Options include developing a protocol to the UNFCCC, creating a standalone treaty for climate displacement, or incorporating climate-related grounds into refugee definitions through amendments to the 1951 Convention.³⁵

Urban Displacement and Integration Programming

Fourth, humanitarian programming must fundamentally adapt to urban displacement realities. As displaced populations increasingly self-settle in urban areas, humanitarian actors must shift from camp-based service delivery models to area-based programming that engages with municipal systems, partners with local governments and civil society organizations, and addresses the interconnected nature of urban refugees’ needs across multiple sectors simultaneously.³⁶ Urban programming should prioritize cash-based interventions that provide refugees with dignity and choice while supporting local economies, legal aid to navigate complex urban regulatory environments, and community-based protection mechanisms that leverage refugees’ own capacities and social networks.³⁷

If there is no sense of moral urgency in this moment of extreme levels of displacement, then the moral principles that institutions are guided by are flawed. While these recommendations may seem idealistic, they highlight the larger and necessary challenge of bringing the United Nations infrastructure into the 21st century or risk the organization’s decline in relevance.

Conclusion

The current crisis of displacement was not inevitable, nor is it unmanageable. However, it presents an existential crisis for the validity of the human rights regime. The refugee crisis that followed WWII motivated world leaders to create a framework to support and protect vulnerable, displaced people. In the contemporary era, that framework proved inadequate to meet the needs of the day. World leaders must rise to these new challenges of fragility induced conflict and climate change in the 21st century and respond accordingly.

The cases of Sudan, Palestine, and Venezuela demonstrate the urgent need for comprehensive reform. Each crisis reveals different aspects of system failure: Sudan highlights how modern conflicts overwhelm emergency response systems and how chronic underfunding leaves millions without adequate protection; Palestine illustrates the problems of protracted displacement, competing protection mandates, and the limitations of legal frameworks when political will to enforce them is absent; Venezuela highlights how economic displacement challenges traditional refugee definitions and how inconsistent regional responses leave protection outcomes dependent on geography rather than need. Meanwhile, the growing crisis of climate displacement, with 2024 marking the highest number of climate-related displacements since 2008, demands recognition that environmental factors can be as life-threatening as political persecution.³⁸

The human rights regime acts as a moral, legal, and political guidepost containing elements of timeless truth that are universal to human experience. However, the implementation of these truths requires adjustments to the current realities of mass displacement and rampant human rights abuses for them to remain important to the lived experience of the global human community. In this moment, it is necessary to question whether human rights have failed human beings.³⁹ There is no greater example of the failure of the human rights regime to protect the world’s most vulnerable than the global response to displacement. The crisis point that we are at now presents an opportunity to overhaul this system, watch idly as the situation deteriorates further, or become apathetic to the historic numbers of the displaced and accept it as a new reality in a world faced with many pressing issues.

Defunding aid and development programs and abandoning the core principles embedded in the human rights regime is not the answer. The growing displacement numbers represent more than just statistics but individual stories of human suffering that demand urgent, comprehensive action. Without reform, the current upward trend in displacement figures suggests disaster. An international protection system stripped of resources and political support precisely when need reaches unprecedented levels is not a solution.⁴⁰

The UN’s Sustainable Development Goals represent an ambitious set of objectives that could truly transform the lives of the many people who represent the greatest need. What the Goals demonstrate is that there is a clear understanding of what needs to be done to create a world that better supports humans’ rights. History will judge the moral soundness and relevance of the human rights regime based on how well it protects the world’s vulnerable and, critically, in the current era, the 123 million displaced people. The question before the international community is whether it possesses the political will to implement necessary reforms before the system collapses entirely under the weight of escalating need, or whether future historians will look back on this moment as one in which the world chose indifference over action in the face of unprecedented human suffering.

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ENDNOTES

¹ Rakesh Kochhar, “Seven-in-ten people globally live on $10 or less per day,” Pew Research Center, September 23, 2015, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/09/23/seven-in-ten-people-globally-live-on-10-or-less-per-day/.

² World Bank Group, “Projected poverty impacts of COVID-19 (coronavirus),” June 8, 2020, https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/poverty/brief/projected-poverty-impacts-of-COVID-19.

³ Mirko Bagaric, “Have human rights failed humans? The discord between human prosperity and human rights,” in Handbook of Human Rights, ed. Thomas Cushman (New York: Routledge, 2013), 570-579.

⁴ Amnesty International, The State of the World’s Human Rights: April 2024 (London: Amnesty International, April 2024).

⁵ Megan Bradley, “Kampala Convention on Internal Displacement in Africa: One Year Later,” Brookings, December 4, 2013, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2013/12/04/kampala-convention-on-internal-displacement-in-africa-one-year-later/.

⁶ Raquel Aldana, “The International Rights of Migrants,” in Handbook of Human Rights, ed. Thomas Cushman (New York: Routledge, 2013), 508-523.

⁷ ReliefWeb, “Sudan conflict and refugee crisis: Multi-country external situation report #10,” April 2025, https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-conflict-and-refugee-crisis-multi-country-external-situation-report-10-covering-reporting-period-march-april-2025.

⁸ UNHCR, “Sudan Situation: Regional Refugee Response,” accessed October 10, 2025, https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/sudansituation.

⁹ UNHCR, “Sudan Regional Refugee Response Plan: January-December 2025,” February 2025, https://reporting.unhcr.org/sudan-situation-2025.

¹⁰ World Bank, Impacts of the Conflict in the Middle East on the Palestinian Economy (Washington, DC: World Bank, September 2024), https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/c25061ab26d14d7acc0330d5a7b4d496-0280012024/original/PalestinianEconomicUpdate-Sept2024-FINAL.pdf.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, “Palestine,” accessed August 16, 2025, https://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/palestine/.

¹³ UNHCR, “Venezuela Situation,” 2024, https://www.unhcr.org/emergencies/venezuela-situation.

¹⁴ Government of Colombia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Temporary Protection Status for Venezuelan Migrants,” 2021, https://www.migracioncolombia.gov.co/estatuto-temporal-de-proteccion.

¹⁵ International Organization for Migration, “Regional Response to the Situation of Venezuelan Migrants and Refugees,” accessed August 16, 2025, https://www.iom.int/regional-response-situation-venezuelan-migrants-and-refugees.

¹⁶ European External Action Service, “Venezuelan displacement demands coordinated international response,” accessed August 16, 2025, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/venezuelan-displacement-demands-coordinated-international-response_en.

¹⁷ Paul Collier and Alexander Betts, Refuge: Rethinking Refugee Policy in a Changing World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 89-92.

¹⁸ Ibid., 93-96.

¹⁹ Amanda Gray Meral, Marcus Langley, and Veronique Barbelet with Arab Renaissance for Democracy and Development, “Inclusion and Exclusion in Urban Refugee Displacement in Jordan,” HPG Working Paper (London: Overseas Development Institute, March 2022), 12, https://media.odi.org/documents/Inclusion_IP_Jordan_case_study_web.pdf.

²⁰ Ibid., 28-32.

²¹ Ibid., 22-38.

²² Ibid., 38-45.

²³ Ibid., 46-49.

²⁴ Bagaric, “Have human rights failed humans?” 570-579.

²⁵ Michael Freeman, Human Rights, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Polity, 2017).

²⁶ Bagaric, “Have human rights failed humans?” 570-579.

²⁷ UNHCR, “UNHCR Steadfast in Refugee Protection as It Completes Review of Operations, Structures and Staffing,” June 16, 2025, https://www.unhcr.org/news/press-releases/unhcr-steadfast-refugee-protection-it-completes-review-operations-structures.

²⁸ UNHCR, “Sudan Regional Refugee Response Plan: January-December 2025.”

²⁹ International Organization for Migration, “Regional Response to the Situation of Venezuelan Migrants and Refugees.”

³⁰ UNHCR, “Sudan Situation: Regional Refugee Response.”

³¹ Jane McAdam, Climate Change, Forced Migration, and International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 37-73.

³² International Organization for Migration, “IDMC Report: Record 83 Million People Living in Internal Displacement Worldwide,” May 13, 2025, https://www.iom.int/news/idmc-report-record-83-million-people-living-internal-displacement-worldwide.

³³ Bradley, “Kampala Convention on Internal Displacement in Africa.”

³⁴ Shombi Sharp, “A Global Migration Framework Under Water: How Can the International Community Protect Climate Refugees?” Chicago Journal of International Law 21, no. 2 (2021): 387-422.

³⁵ McAdam, Climate Change, Forced Migration, and International Law, 248-275.

³⁶ Meral, Langley, and Barbelet, “Inclusion and Exclusion in Urban Refugee Displacement in Jordan,” 46-49.

³⁷ Ibid., 50-54.

³⁸ Earth.org, “2024 Saw Highest New Climate-Related Displacements Since 2008,” March 20, 2025, https://earth.org/extreme-weather-events-in-2024-led-to-highest-number-of-new-displacements-since-2008/.

³⁹ Bagaric, “Have human rights failed humans?” 570-579.

⁴⁰ Sharp, “A Global Migration Framework Under Water,” 387-422; LSE-Oxford Commission on State Fragility, Growth and Development, Escaping the Fragility Trap (London: International Growth Centre, 2018), 5-7.

Introduction

For years, millions of Afghan refugees have been knocking on the door seeking safety, dignity, and hope. Their cries for refuge have echoed across borders, especially in neighboring countries like Pakistan. As of January 2025, Pakistan hosts around 1.6 million Afghan refugees and asylum-seekers, along with over 1.5 million Afghans with different legal statuses.^[1] Most reside in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (54%) and Balochistan (24%), the two provinces bordering Afghanistan.^[2] Around 30% live in rural refugee settlements, while 70% are in urban or peri-urban areas.^[3] However, on January 31, 2025, Pakistan’s Ministry of Interior ordered that all undocumented Afghans, including holders of Afghan Citizen Cards, must leave Islamabad and Rawalpindi or face deportation.^[4] Even those with Proof of Registration (PoR) cards were asked to leave by August 31.^[5] Moreover, a recent notification issued by the Interior Ministry instructed them to close the Afghan Refugee camps.^[6] These moves triggered mass arrests and forced deportations and violating the principle of non-refoulement.

Against this background, this article will present the history of Afghan refugees in Pakistan. It will then explore the legal frameworks, both international agreements and national laws that govern their status. The article will also analyse how Pakistan’s recent mass deportation violates legal obligations. In the next part, it will assess how the Taliban regime and the global community have responded to these developments. Finally, some recommendations will be provided from the author’s perspective.

History of Afghan Refugees

The first batch of Afghan refugees arrived in Pakistan following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.^[7] Initially considered a temporary displacement, it became a protracted refugee crisis over the following decades. By the 1990s Pakistan became home to one of the world’s largest refugee populations, with numbers peaking at around 3.2 million registered Afghan refugees during the height of the civil war in Afghanistan.^[8] For nearly four decades, Pakistan maintained what could be described as a relatively hospitable approach to Afghan refugees. However, this relationship changed drastically after the Taliban returned to power in 2021. Due to the Taliban regime, Afghanistan saw a new wave of displacement. As per the government of Pakistan, 600,000 have sought refuge since the events of 2021.^[9] However, this wave of displacement differed from previous ones. While earlier refugees fled war and instability, the 2021 refugees were fleeing a regime that posed a direct threat to their safety based on their professions, gender, or past associations.^[10] Many of those displaced since 2021 have been well-educated professionals, women’s rights activists, and journalists - precisely groups the Taliban has targeted for persecution.

Legal Agreements and National Laws for the Afghan People

To understand the legal status of Afghan refugees, it is important to look at the various legal agreements and national laws that have shaped their position over time.

● First Agreement: In 1988, the very first agreement between Pakistan and UNHCR regarding the voluntary return of Afghan refugees started taking shape following the Soviet Union withdrawal from Afghanistan.^[11] The implementing agreement refers to the voluntary repatriation of ‘Afghan refugees’.^[12] Notably, in the very first agreement Afghan people were referred to as refugees. However, this agreement did not address what might happen to those who refused to return voluntarily. This created a gap in the long-term protection.

● Second Agreement: The second agreement in 1993 became a tripartite arrangement including Afghanistan after the fall of the Najibullah government, focusing on voluntary repatriation. Again, in this agreement terms like “Afghan refugee” were used.^[13] However, it remained completely silent on the fate of non-returnees, establishing a troubling pattern of ignoring permanent protection needs.

● Third Agreement: The third agreement, also in 1993, was a cooperation agreement that formally recognized UNHCR’s presence in Pakistan after 14 years of informal operations, creating the legal foundation for refugee protection activities but coming remarkably late given UNHCR’s presence since 1979.^[14]

● Fourth Agreement: The fourth agreement in 2001 marked a major shift in Pakistan’s refugee policy. Instead of recognizing all Afghans as refugees, Pakistan introduced individual screening in specific camps. This showed that Pakistan no longer saw new Afghan arrivals as automatically deserving protection. Instead, they were seen mostly as economic migrants. Only some were identified as needing international protection, but even then, they were not officially called “refugees.”^[15] They were labeled “persons of concern” and given only temporary protection, without saying who was responsible for them.^[16]

● Fifth and Sixth Agreement: Pakistan took a stricter stance in the fifth agreement, changing the term “Afghan refugees” to “Afghan citizens who have sought refuge in Pakistan.”^[17] This agreement set a fixed timeline for repatriation, lasting until March 2006. The sixth agreement in 2004 introduced a proper census and registration system, as neither Pakistan nor UNHCR knew how many Afghans were living in the country.^[18]

● Seventh Agreement: The seventh agreement in 2006 registered 3 million Afghans and gave them temporary resident cards for three years. However, these cards did not provide new rights.^[19] UNHCR called it just a protection measure for ID purposes and warned it could weaken existing refugee status.

● Eighth Agreement: The eighth and final agreement in 2007 extended the voluntary return program to 2009 but removed any protection for those who stayed after.^[20] This clearly showed that Pakistan had moved from an open-door policy to a more rigid and limited approach toward Afghan refugees.

Foreigners Act of 1946

Throughout this period, Pakistan never signed the 1951 Refugee Convention, leaving all refugees to be governed by the colonial-era Foreigners Act of 1946, which was designed to control foreign nationals rather than protect refugees. Section 14(2) makes it a serious criminal offense for any foreigner to “knowingly enter Pakistan illegally,” punishable by imprisonment of up to 10 years and fines up to 10,000 rupees, creating severe penalties for refugees who often have no choice but to enter without proper documentation.^[21] The Act’s primary premise is preserving “national security,” but it provides no clear definition of what constitutes a threat to “the security of Pakistan,” giving authorities broad discretionary powers to detain and deport refugees. In 2016, after the 2014 terrorist attack on the Army Public School in Peshawar, the government changed the Foreigners Act by updating section 14(d). This change required all illegal immigrants, including refugees, to be registered through the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA). This effectively tied refugee registration to national security and counter-terrorism measures.^[22] While intended to strengthen security, this also made Afghan refugees more vulnerable, as their legal status became closely monitored, increasing the risk of detention or deportation even for those with valid protection documents.

Legal Status of the Afghan People

The current system has created three distinct categories of Afghans in Pakistan with vastly different levels of protection.

● Proof of Registration: According to the IRFC, the first category consists of 1.43 million Proof of Registration (PoR) cardholders^[23] who possess UNHCR-issued identity documents verified by NADRA, giving them legal status to remain in Pakistan as recognized refugees with protection against arbitrary arrest under the Foreigners Act valid until 30 June 2025.

● Afghan Citizen Card: The second category includes 800,700 Afghan Citizen Card (ACC) holders who were registered in 2017-2018 through a separate exercise aimed at encouraging return to Afghanistan, providing them with temporary legal status and protection from deportation.^[24]

● Undocumented Afghans: The third and most vulnerable category comprises 1.7 million undocumented Afghans,^[25] including those who fled after the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021 without valid visas or identity documents, as well as those whose previous legal status has expired, leaving them with no protection against arrest, detention, and deportation under the Foreigners Act.

Violation of Legal Obligations

International Obligations

Now the question is whether Pakistan has the legal right to deport Afghan refugees. Since Pakistan has not signed the 1951 Refugee Convention, some argue that it has no international obligation. So, mass deportation might seem legal under the Foreigners Act of 1946. However, this is where the principle of non-refoulement becomes important.

The principle of non-refoulement means that no one should be sent back to a country where they could face persecution, torture, violence, or any serious human rights abuse. It is primarily mentioned in Article 33(1) of the 1951 Refugee Convention, which states: “No Contracting State shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened.” ^[26]

Although Pakistan is not a party to this convention, this principle has become part of customary international law, meaning it is binding on all states because it reflects a global standard of humane conduct.^[27] In other words, Pakistan must follow it even without signing the Refugee Convention, because it is considered a universal obligation under international law. Beyond custom, Pakistan is bound through its commitments under international human rights treaties it has ratified. Under Article 3 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), Pakistan must not return anyone to a country where there are strong grounds to believe they would face torture.^[28] Similarly, Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) which Pakistan ratified in 2010, prohibits torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.^[29] Together, these provisions reaffirm Pakistan’s duty to assess the safety of every return and to prevent sending individuals back to danger, regardless of their legal status.

In practice, however, Pakistan’s ongoing deportation campaign tells a different story. Recent UNHCR data shows that 93% of Afghan refugees returned to Afghanistan due to fear of arrest by the Pakistani security apparatus, rather than of their own free will.^[30] Moreover, between 5 and 11 October 2025, the total number of Afghan returns decreased by 24%, while deportations increased by 20% compared to the previous week.^[31] Many returnees faced home raids, detention, beatings, and the confiscation of documents by Pakistani police which created an environment of indirect refoulement. When fear drives people to leave, it is not a voluntary return rather it is coercion. This is a clear violation of the principle of non-refoulement, which is the backbone of refugee protection.

National Obligations

It is not only international law that underscores Pakistan’s responsibility toward Afghan refugees; the country’s own courts have emphasized the same. A key example is the Islamabad High Court’s decision in Rahil Azizi v. The State in June 2023. .^[32] Rahil Azizi, an Afghan woman, was facing deportation from Pakistan in June 2023. Her case reached the Islamabad High Court, which delivered a landmark judgment. The court ruled that Pakistan cannot deport individuals to a country where they face a real risk of torture or inhumane treatment. The court stressed that, while Pakistan has not signed the 1951 Refugee Convention, it is still bound by other international treaties-specifically, the Convention Against Torture and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.^[33] Under Article 3(1) of the Convention Against Torture, no one should be returned to a country where they may face torture. The court made it clear: deporting Rahil Azizi would violate this principle. According to Amnesty International, in January 2025, the government assured the Supreme Court of Pakistan that all Afghan refugees who had been registered in any form would neither be apprehended nor deported.^[34] Moreover, the Islamabad High Court also directed authorities to stop all harassment of PoR cardholders.^[35]

UNHCR data shows that between 17 and 23 August, Afghan ACC holders and undocumented individuals made up 93% of all arrests and detentions.^[36] The remaining were primarily PoR card holders, who were supposed to be protected under the grace period allowing them to stay in Pakistan without risk of arrest. Despite these clear instructions, police continue to arrest Afghan PoR holders, openly disregarding the court’s orders. This not only undermines the authority of the judiciary but also seriously damages Pakistan’s credibility as a state committed to the rule of law and the protection of refugees.

Current situation of mass deportation

The mass deportation of Afghan refugees from Pakistan did not begin in January 2025; it started much earlier. On 1 October 2023, the Pakistani government announced that all “illegal foreigners” had to leave within a month or face deportation.^[37] As per the data of Crisis Group, in November 2023, the first phase began, targeting around 1.3 million Afghans without legal documents.^[38] By February 2025, over 800,000 had returned to Afghanistan, many of them out of fear.^[39] On 7 March 2025, the second phase was launched.^[40] The interior ministry canceled all ACCs and told those cardholders and undocumented Afghans to leave by 31 March or face deportation.^[41] On the other hand, PoR cardholders were still protected but only until 31 August.^[42]

The mass deportation of Afghan refugees from Pakistan has reached a shocking level. Since January 2025, the situation has only gotten worse. Pakistani police began night raids across Islamabad, arresting Afghans including women and children without any legal process.^[43] According to the UNHRC, from January 1 to October 11, over 81,837 Afghans were arrested.^[44] Most were targeted simply for being Afghans. Police entered homes without warrants, beat people, and even stole refugee documents.^[45] Families were separated, with no explanation or legal help.

Afghan journalists and human rights defenders became soft targets of Pakistani authorities. Freshta Sadeed, a journalist who fled the Taliban for her reporting, was detained in April 2025^[46] and nearly deported back to the same regime she escaped. In June, another journalist, Naseer Behroz, was arrested the same way.^[47] These actions silence voices that have risked everything for truth and they violate the basic right to seek asylum and safety.

Moreover, this deportation drive is crushing for Afghan women and girls. According to UNHCR, over 370,311 women have been sent back to Afghanistan.^[48] The Gender in Humanitarian Action Working Group, led by UN Women and UNFPA, found that women and girls face the worst suffering.^[49] Those without a male guardian (mahram) reported harassment and extortion at border crossings like Torkham and Islam Qala. In Kandahar, a humanitarian worker described a widow with four daughters who was so desperate she considered selling her children just to survive.^[50] The Taliban’s treatment of women is no secret. Many women have been arrested for their dress,^[51] 78 per cent of young Afghan women are not in education,^[52] and face daily harassment. In addition to violating established international legal norms, sending women and girls back to these conditions also constitutes a form of gender-based violence.

The recent closure of Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan has further worsened the situation for refugees. On 17 October 2025, officials announced that 28 more Afghan refugee camps in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa were shut down.^[53] According to the Interior Ministry, eight camps in Peshawar alone were closed. Authorities were instructed to return all vehicles, equipment, and facilities previously provided to the camps to their respective district administrations.^[54]

UNHCR data shows that since 1 April 2025, 745,273 Afghan nationals have returned to Afghanistan, and for PoR card holders, the closure of camps and settlements was a primary reason for their departure (33%).^[55] The shutting down of these camps removes critical protection and support structures, leaving refugees with little access to shelter, food, and basic services. Without these safe spaces, many PoR holders may be forced to return under unsafe conditions, heightening the risk of exposure to violence, harassment, and other human rights violations.

National and international response

Since the start of Pakistan’s mass deportation campaign, the UN and other international bodies have raised serious concerns, but their response has fallen short. In a recent statement, UN experts clearly warned that returnees face the risk of persecution, torture, and violent reprisals, especially women, girls, LGBTQ, and gender-diverse people, who face criminalization and abuse under Taliban rule.^[56] Amnesty International and Front Line Defenders^[57] echoed the same fears. Despite these warnings, the response from international actors has mostly remained in the form of statements. So far, there’s been no serious pressure on Pakistan to stop.

The Taliban, on its part, claimed in February 2025 that Pakistan had not informed them about the deportations. Diplomats claimed they had reached out several times through diplomatic channels but received no clear response.^[58] The Afghan Embassy expressed “serious concern” over the mass expulsions and the lack of coordination. At the same time, the Taliban’s ambassador in Islamabad requested a trilateral meeting with Pakistan and the UN to discuss the refugee situation.^[59] But this remains unlikely, as Taliban officials are under international travel sanctions under the UN Security Council Resolution 1988, which requires special waivers for sanctioned officials to engage in diplomacy abroad.^[60]

Without such waivers, dialogue remains broken, and the refugees suffer in the political crossfire. Meanwhile, Pakistan justifies its actions on security grounds, yet detains even UNHCR-documented individuals, blatantly violating the principle of non-refoulement.^[61] While having no sympathy for the Taliban’s rule, the complete lack of coordination between states and institutions is hurting ordinary Afghans, not the Taliban leadership.

On the geopolitical front, the return of Donald Trump to the U.S. presidency worsened the crisis. His immediate freezing of the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) and the effective shutdown of the Afghan Special Immigrant Visa program left nearly 20,000 Afghans in Pakistan stranded without hope of resettlement.^[62] These policies, tied to a broader strategy of aid cuts and isolationism, signal a troubling shift. This has a domino effect-other nations are also pulling back, and fewer safe pathways are being offered. While Italy pledged $3.5 million, it’s barely a fraction of the $477 million the IOM says is needed for urgent humanitarian aid.^[63] Hence, it can be said that geopolitical rivalries, UN inefficiencies, and American disengagement are leaving vulnerable Afghans with nowhere safe to go.

Conclusion and way forward

The situation of Afghan refugees has always been fragile, but the recent mass deportations from Pakistan have made things worse. These refugees, already suffering from a humanitarian crisis, are now facing human rights violations. Based on the earlier discussion, it is clear that Pakistan has a responsibility to protect them under the principle of non-refoulement. Given the current Taliban regime, it’s clear that returning Afghans are at high risk of violence, repression, and human rights violations, especially women and girls. Still, Pakistan continues to deport people, often arresting and detaining them without proper procedures, which clearly breaches international law. If world powers and UN institutions fail to act now, we risk letting another generation of Afghans suffer in silence. Hence, based on the previous analysis, the following recommendations are provided to address the ongoing situation and ensure stronger protection for Afghan refugees:

● The United States and the European Union should make all future financial aid and trade benefits to Pakistan dependent on its full respect for the principle of non-refoulement, meaning no refugee should be forced back to danger. This condition should be clearly monitored and verified before any continued support is provided.

● Countries like Canada, the United Kingdom, and Australia should introduce a quick, simplified visa program for the most vulnerable Afghans still in Pakistan. Priority should be given to women leaders, journalists, and human rights defenders who face the highest risks and need urgent relocation.

● The UN Human Rights Council should urgently set up an independent investigation team to document how returnees are being treated and what conditions Afghans still in Pakistan are facing. This will help create an official public record and ensure Pakistani authorities are held accountable for any violations.

● Key regional partners such as Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Qatar should engage directly with Pakistan’s political and military leadership. Through private and high-level diplomacy, they should use their strong ties to push Pakistan to stop the deportations and adopt a more humane approach.

● With many formal refugee camps now closed, international donors and legal aid organizations should immediately support mobile legal clinics along major deportation routes and transit hubs. These moving teams can give real-time information in Pashto and Dari, quickly record asylum cases, and provide urgent legal help to those being forced out, ensuring that people still receive basic due process and protection even in chaotic situations.

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^[1] UNHRC, ‘Strategy 2025, Emergency analysis’ 2025,https://reporting.unhcr.org/operational/operations/islamic-republic-pakistan.

^[2] Ibid.

^[3] Ibid.

^[4] Human Rights Watch, “Pakistan: Forced Returns Expose Afghans to Persecution, Destitution”, March 19,2025, https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/03/19/pakistan-forced-returns-expose-afghans-persecution-destitution

^[5] Gabin Blackburn, “Pakistan extends deportation deadline for Afghan refugees but UN remains concerned” Euro News, August 06,2025, https://www.euronews.com/2025/08/06/pakistan-extends-deportation-deadline-for-afghan-refugees-but-un-remains-concerned.

^[6] Business Standard, “28 more Afghan refugee camps shut down in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa” October 17,2025, https://www.business-standard.com/world-news/28-more-afghan-refugee-camps-shut-down-in-pakistan-s-khyber-pakhtunkhwa-125101700616_1.html.

^[7] Forced Migration Review, “Afghanistan: conflict and displacement 1978 to 2001” 2001, https://www.fmreview.org/ruiz/.

^[8] Muhammad Najam ud din Farani, “Perspectives on Afghan Refugee identity in Pakistan” Journal of Political Studies 27, no 2 (2021): 159-181, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/344658002_Perspectives_on_Afghan_Refugee_identity_in_Pakistan.

^[9] Operational Data Portal, “Overview of Pakistan Operation” August 2025, https://data.unhcr.org/en/country/pak.

^[10] Human Rights Watch, “What’s Next for Afghans Fleeing the Taliban?” September 9,2021, https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/09/09/whats-next-afghans-fleeing-taliban.

^[11] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Agreement Between the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees on the Voluntary Return of Refugees” December 19, 1988.

^[12] Ibid

^[13] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Agreement Between the Government of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees for the Repatriation of Afghan Refugees in Pakistan” 1993.

^[14] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,“Cooperation Agreement Between The Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan And The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees” September 18, 1993, 1733 UNTS 79, https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%201733/v1733.pdf”.

^[15] Marjoleine Zieck, The Legal Status of Afghan Refugees in Pakistan, a Story of Eight Agreements and Two Suppressed Premises, International Journal of Refugee Law 20, issue 2 (2008): 253–272, https://doi.org/10.1093/ijrl/een014.

^[16] Ibid

^[17] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), “Agreement Between the Government of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Governing the Repatriation of Afghan Citizens Living in Pakistan” March 17, 2003, https://www.refworld.org/docid/42fb2b7be.html.

^[18] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), “Memorandum of Understanding

between the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) on the Census and Registration of Afghan Citizens Living in Pakistan” December 17, 2004, https://www.refworld.org/docid/55e6a3534.html.

^[19] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), “Memorandum of Understanding

between the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (GOP) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) on the Registration of Afghan Citizens Living in Pakistan” April 19, 2006, https://www.refworld.org/docid/55e6a0374.html.

^[20] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), “Agreement Between the Government of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Governing the Repatriation of Afghan Citizens Living in Pakistan” August 2, 2007, https://www.refworld.org/docid/555ae4254.html.

^[21] The Foreigners Act, 1946 (Act No. XXXI of 1946), 1946, http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b4f314.html.

^[22] Arjumand Bano Kazmi, “Pakistan’s Judicial Engagement with International Refugee Law” International Journal of Refugee Law 36, issue 4(2024) : 397–418, https://doi.org/10.1093/ijrl/eeaf001.

^[23] IRFC, “Afghan Nationals Return from Pakistan - April 2025 - DREF Operation MDRPK027” April 25, 2025,https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/afghan-nationals-return-pakistan-april-2025-dref-operation-mdrpk027.

^[24] Ibid

^[25] Ibid.

^[26] UN General Assembly, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 189, p. 137.

^[27] Global Stratigic Litigation Council, “Expert Report on Non-Refoulement as a Principle of Customary International Law” December 2,2023, https://www.global-council.org/resources/expert-report-on-non-refoulement-as-a-principle-of-customary-international-law.

^[28] UN General Assembly, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Treaty Series, vol. 1465, p. 85 (1984)

^[29] UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Treaty Series, vol. 999, p. 171 (1966).

^[30] UNHCR, “UNHCR-IOM Pakistan Flash update # 64 on Arrest and Detention/Flow Monitoring,(15 September 2023 – 11 October 2025)” October 17, 2025,https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/119232.

^[31] Ibid

^[32] Raas Nabeel, “Case Note: Rahil Azizi v the State and Others” RSIL, October 18,2023, https://rsilpak.org/2023/case-note-rahil-azizi-v-the-state-and-others/.

^[33] Kazmi, Pakistan’s Judicial Engagement with International Refugee Law.

^[34] Amnesty international, “Pakistan: Opaque ‘Illegal Foreigners Repatriation Plan’ targeting Afghan refugees must be withdrawn” March 26, 2025, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/03/opaque-illegal-foreigners-repatriation-plan-targeting-afghan-refugees-must-be-withdrawn/.

^[35] Ibid

^[36] UNHCR, “UNHCR-IOM Pakistan Flash update # 57 on Arrest and Detention/Flow Monitoring,15 Sep 2023 to 23 August 2025, August 29, 2025,https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/118301. .

^[37] Al Jazeera, “Pakistan wants undocumented migrants to leave by November 1 or get deported” October 3,2023,

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/3/pakistan-wants-undocumented-migrants-to-leave-by-november-1-or-get-deported.

^[38] Crisis Group, “Pakistan-Afghanistan: Tempering the Deportation Drive” May 22,2025, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/pakistan-afghanistan/pakistan-afghanistan-tempering-deportation-drive.

^[39] Ibid.

^[40] Amnesty International, “Pakistan: ‘Treat us like human beings’: Afghans in Pakistan at risk of unlawful deportation” April 4, 2025, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa33/9217/2025/en/.

^[41] Reuters, “Pakistan asks illegal foreigners, Afghan Citizen Card holders to leave by March 31” May 7,2025,https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pakistan-asks-illegal-foreigners-afghan-citizen-card-holders-leave-by-march-31-2025-03-07/.

^[42] Gabin Blackburn, Pakistan extends deportation deadline for Afghan refugees but UN remains concerned.

^[43]Afghanistan International, “Renewed Arrests & Harassment Of Afghan Refugees In Pakistan Must Stop, Says Amnesty” January 9,2025, https://www.afintl.com/en/202501090366.

^[44]UNHCR, Flash update # 64.

^[45] Human Rights Watch,Pakistan: Forced Returns Expose Afghans to Persecution, Destitution.

^[46] Siyar Sirat, “Pakistani police detain Afghan journalist, group reports” Amu Tv, April 15,2025, https://amu.tv/168826/.

^[47] Siyar Sirat, “Afghan journalist detained by Pakistani police, faces possible deportation” Amu Tv, June 5, 2025, https://amu.tv/178580/.

^[48] UNHCR, Flash Update 64.

^[49] Siyar Sirat, “Women and girls face mounting perils as forced returns from Iran and Pakistan surge, report says” July 4,2025, https://amu.tv/184420/.

^[50] Ibid

^[51] Sahar Ferat, “Afghan Women Continue to Fight for Bodily Autonomy” Human Rights Watch, July 27,2025, https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/03/19/pakistan-forced-returns-expose-afghans-persecution-destitution.

^[52] UN Women, “Nearly eight out of 10 young Afghan women are excluded from education, jobs, and training” June 17,2025, https://www.unwomen.org/en/news-stories/press-release/2025/06/nearly-eight-out-of-10-young-afghan-women-are-excluded-from-education-jobs-and-training.

^[53] The Economic Times, “28 more Afghan refugee camps shut down in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa” October 17, 2025, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/28-more-afghan-refugee-camps-shut-down-in-pakistans-khyber-pakhtunkhwa/articleshow/124624890.cms?from=mdr.

^[54] Siyar Sirat, “Pakistan to shut down 16 Afghan refugee camps” Amu Tv, September 28,2025,https://amu.tv/202498/.

^[55] UNHCR, Flash Update 64.

^[56] OHCHR, “UN experts appalled by mass forced returns of Afghan nationals” July 18, 2025, https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/07/un-experts-appalled-mass-forced-returns-afghan-nationals.

^[57] Front Line Defenders, “Pakistan: Mass expulsion of at-risk Afghans imperils lives of writers, journalists, human rights defenders and others persecuted by the Taliban” May 28,2025, https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/statement-report/pakistan-mass-expulsion-risk-afghans-imperils-lives-writers-journalists-human.

^[58] Ayaz Gul, “Taliban confirm Pakistan’s new plan for swift mass eviction of Afghan refugees ” VOA News, February 19,2025,https://www.voanews.com/a/taliban-confirm-pakistan-s-new-plan-for-swift-mass-eviction-of-afghan-refugees-/7980321.html.

^[59] Afghanistan International, “Taliban Calls For Trilateral Meet With Pak, UN Over Afghan Refugee Expulsions” February 22,2025, https://www.afintl.com/en/202502222790.

^[60] United Nations Security Council, “ Resolution 1988” United Nations, S/RES/1988, June 17, 2011,https://docs.un.org/en/S/RES/1988%20(2011).

^[61] Ayaz Gul, Taliban confirm Pakistan’s new plan for swift mass eviction of Afghan refugees.

^[62] Mallaika Thapar and Shivam Shekhawat, “Afghan refugees in 2025: The far-reaching impact of US aid cuts” ORF, March 4,2025, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/afghan-refugees-in-2025-the-far-reaching-impact-of-us-aid-cuts.

^[63] Osama Ahmad and Ali M. Latifi, “For Afghans in Pakistan, legal papers now offer no protection from deportation” The New Humanitarian, May 7, 2025, https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2025/05/07/afghans-pakistan-legal-papers-now-offer-no-protection-deportation.

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18. ReliefWeb. (2025b, June 20). Starvation closing in: Urgent help needed in Kenya’s refugee camps. Retrieved from https://reliefweb.int/report/kenya/starvation-closing-urgent-help-needed-kenyas-refugee-camps

19. Reuters. (2025, April 25). UN agencies for food, refugees plan deep cuts as funding plummets. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/un-agencies-food-refugees-plan-deep-cuts-funding-plummets-documents-show-2025- 04-25/#:~:text=GENEVA%2C%20April%2025%20%28Reuters%29%2C%20how%20to%20maintain%20hunger%20relief

20. The Jakarta Post. (2025, June 16). UN scales back global aid plan due to ‘deepest funding cuts ever’. Retrieved from https://www.thejakartapost.com/world/2025/06/16/un-scales-back-global-aid-plan-due-to-deepest-funding-cuts-ever.html

21. The Standard. (2025, March 13). Four shot in Kakuma refugee camp protests over food cuts. Retrieved from https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001490984/four-shot-in-kakuma-refugee-camp-protests-over-food-cuts

22. Turkana County Government. (n.d.). County government takes over health facilities from UNHCR and IRC. Retrieved from https://turkana.go.ke/county-government-takes-over-health-facilities-from-unhcr-and-irc/

23. UNHCR. (n.d.-a). Funding cuts threaten the health of nearly 13 million displaced people. Retrieved from https://www.unhcr.org/news/briefing-notes/unhcr-funding-cuts-threaten-health-nearly-13-million-displaced-people

24. UNHCR. (n.d.-b). Statement by UNHCR’s Filippo Grandi on the impact of global aid cuts on refugees. Retrieved from https://www.unhcr.org/hk/en/news/press-releases/statement-unhcr-s-filippo-grandi-impact-global-aid-cuts-refugees

25. UNHCR. (n.d.-c). The impact of global aid cuts on refugees (Switzerland for UNHCR). Retrieved from https://unrefugees.ch/en/news/impact-global-aid-cuts-refugees

26. UNHCR. (n.d.-d). Kakuma refugee camp. Retrieved from https://www.unhcr.org/ke/kakuma-refugee-camp UNHCR. (n.d.-e).

27. Kakuma settlement sustainable energy project. Retrieved from https://www.unhcr.org/blogs/kakuma-settlement sustainable-energy-project

28. UNHCR. (2024a). Global Report 2024. Retrieved from https://www.unhcr.org/publications/global-report

29. UNHCR Kenya. (2024b, April). UNHCR Kenya operational update, February 2024. Retrieved from https://www.unhcr.org/ke/wp content/uploads/sites/2/2024/04/UNHCR_Kenya_Operational_Update_February-2024.pdf

30. USAFacts. (n.d.). How much foreign aid does the US give out? Retrieved from https://www.usafacts.org/articles/how-much-foreign aid-does-the-us-give-out/

31. Visual Capitalist. (n.d.). Countries that receive the most foreign aid from the US. Retrieved from https://www.visualcapitalist.com/cp/countries-that-receive-the-most-foreign-aid-from-the-us/

32. WFP. (2025a, June 17). WFP welcomes US$37 million from US government to support refugees in Kenya. Retrieved from https://www.wfp.org/news/wfp-welcomes-us37-million-us-government-support-refugees-kenya-and-moves-prioritise-food

PART I: The Drivers of a Crisis

An unprecedented crisis of human displacement challenges the 21st century. In 2022, over 100 million people were forcibly displaced, reaching the highest levels ever recorded.¹ According to UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Filippo Grandi, “It’s a record that should never have been set.”² Yet, since then, that number has only grown to 123 million by the end of 2024.³ Clear deficiencies in the structure of the international system designed to support vulnerable people such as inadequate funding, the narrow legal definition of refugees in international law, and a failure to reform anachronistic policy are just some of the challenges at the core of this explosive growth of forced displacement.

The global refugee regime created in the chaos of the post-WWII reconstruction of Europe and expanded at the onset of the Cold War has largely proved inadequate to respond to the surge in displacement in the current era. The defects in the refugee system, coupled with the intersecting crises of state fragility, conflict, economic, and climate change induced displacement, have combined to disastrous effect, producing a system in which the human rights of refugees are routinely encroached upon or ignored.⁴

In 2025, the United Nations celebrates its 80th anniversary amidst ongoing debates about the organization’s relevance, sharp declines in donor funding, and consistent infighting between member states. The reform-oriented UN Pact for the Future, adopted just a year ago, has since largely fallen victim to rapid geo-political change and the withdrawal of billions in funding by the United States. The UNHCR, as a part of the UN system, is reducing 50% of leadership positions at its Geneva headquarters, thousands of positions at global field offices, and reducing the scale of its overall operations.⁵

While these challenges persist the delivery of rights affirmed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) fails to support those most vulnerable to rights abuses because it does not specify who is obligated to fulfill which rights.⁶ A traditionalist view holds nation-states responsible for implementing rights yet, paradoxically, recognizes that states are also most likely to violate them.⁷ Equally relevant, poorer states have a lower capacity to fulfill certain rights that entail very real costs, yet host some of the highest numbers of internally displaced people and refugees.

This report will describe how flaws within the global refugee system have left it inadequately equipped to respond to the intersecting crises of the 21st century, emphasize how this undermines the human rights of refugees, and conclude with some prescriptions for effective system changes amidst declining support for the UN system in a time of critical need.

A Flawed System

Historical Origins and Contemporary Limitations

The primary driver of displacement is human insecurity. Dangerous threats to life and wellbeing force people to leave their homes and become either internally displaced persons or cross an international border to become classified as refugees. Both internally displaced persons and refugees are often victims of similar circumstances. However, under the current international legal system, refugees are entitled to a different set of protections. Non-conflict and forced displacement are also often confused for the same process as a result of what McDowell & Morrell term the “asylum-migration nexus,” wherein each group commonly share similar vulnerabilities, routes, and methods of travel.⁸

This is a critically important distinction because of the United Nations’ very limited definition of a refugee and the corresponding set of legal protections afforded them under international law. In the two most important legal agreements regarding international refugees, the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol, which applied the terms of the 1951 convention outside of Europe, refugees are legally defined as those fleeing ‘persecution’.⁹ This definition was relevant to the post-WWII context and the gross persecution of Jews in Europe. The horrors of WWII were a motivating factor in drafting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and establishing the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

The UNHCR, created in 1950, had a limited mandate to respond to the mass flight of European refugees due to WWII.¹⁰ The institution of the UNHCR, the 1951 Convention and its sole amendment, the 1967 Protocol, have since been extended far beyond their initial mandate and are central to the contemporary global refugee system with 149 states out of 193 recognized United Nations member states having ratified either one, or both instruments as of 2024.¹¹

Currently, global governance lacks an international convention guaranteeing rights to internally displaced persons, but The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement operates as a normative framework that has grown in use.¹² The result of the narrow mandate of the UNHCR, the absence of a convention that protects internally displaced persons, and the limited definition of what constitutes a refugee is extremely inadequate protections for many of the world’s currently displaced people in the contemporary era including those fleeing gang violence, climate change induced extreme weather events, and other forms of generalized insecurity.

In the Modern Era

Human insecurity in the 21st century is the result of the complex intersection of a broad range of economic, environmental, sociopolitical, and security factors. Insecurity is a common feature of modern life and threatens many people around the world, but particularly those living in environments characterized by state fragility.¹³ Violent conflict, climate change induced extreme weather events, disease, and economic crises in fragile states create insecurity that drives displacement. Whereas states that are politically, socially, and economically stable are more likely to have the resources necessary to support displaced persons, in fragile states, institutions rarely have these resources, driving people from their homes to seek safety.

According to Collier and Betts, there are typically between forty and sixty fragile states, but even then, only a handful of these produce the vast majority of displaced persons.¹⁴ Many of the currently displaced are fleeing persistent violence in countries such as Syria and Afghanistan. In the past five years, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Israel’s invasion of Gaza, the Sudanese Civil War, ongoing political and economic collapse in Venezuela, and an unparalleled increase in climate change induced displacement has combined to contribute to a sharp uptick in displacement. Conflict in fragile state conditions remains responsible for most displacement, but increasingly climate change induced extreme weather events have contributed to the growing numbers of all categories of human migration.

Complex Drivers of Displacement

Conflict

The majority of the world’s displaced people flee from conflict. According to the UNHCR’s 2024 Global Trends Report, 68.1 million internally displaced people of the 123.2 million total forcibly fled conflicts.¹⁵ Data on conflict induced cross border displacement is difficult to collect because there are often multiple, intersecting drivers of flight however, of the 42.7 million refugees identified by the UNHCR at the end of the previous year, many fled countries and regions experiencing active conflict. At least 67% of all refugees come from just five countries, including Ukraine, Afghanistan, South Sudan, Syria, and Venezuela. Four of those five countries have experienced conflict in the last decade.

Conflict-induced displacement happens because of both violence and the widespread systemic effects of that violence. The characteristics of violence shape displacement, including whether a conflict is an internal conflict between groups competing for power or regional actors. Forced displacement may be a goal of one group within a conflict-affected area, as in Myanmar, where the state continues to wage a genocidal campaign against the country’s ethnic minority Rohingya group to expel them from the country. Currently, there are at least 1 million Rohingya in neighboring Bangladesh who exist in dire conditions in some of the world’s largest refugee camps.¹⁶ Alongside state violence perpetrated against the Rohingya and other civilian populations, Myanmar is also experiencing an armed conflict between state and non-state groups that is driving both internal and cross-border migration. The 2024 Annual Results Report for Myanmar indicates the civil war caused at least 1.4 million displacements within one year alone and the military government has been accused of indiscriminate shelling, the use of landmines against civilians, and airstrikes.¹⁷ The devastating crisis in Myanmar underscores the multiple, complex, and overlapping ways that various types of violence lead to displacement.

Violence also creates far-reaching social, economic, ecological, and political disruption that endangers life and causes displacement. The disruption of livelihoods, education, access to healthcare, food, water, and shelter that is a defining feature of violent conflict are direct threats to life that often trigger displacement. Violence and conflict create untenable conditions for productive life such that even people who may be far from the daily experience of violence must relocate to access life-preserving social services or economic stability. According to a 2024 World Bank Report, the widespread destruction of residential buildings, schools, hospitals, shopping centers, and other vital infrastructure displaced over 1.6 million people in Gaza as the economy contracted 86% in the first quarter of 2024 on record as the largest economic contraction documented.¹⁸

In such conditions, the functions of key institutions and systems collapse. In the absence of important social services and often even basic needs, people are forced to flee. Importantly, conditions in which governments lack the resources or will to support the populations often contribute to the intensity and length of conflicts which creates a reinforced feedback loop of fragility and conflict.

Fragility and Displacement

State fragility represents one of the most salient drivers of forced displacement globally. Fragile states are fundamentally characterized by weak institutional capacity and insufficient political legitimacy that leave them structurally unable to provide security for their citizens.¹⁹ A fragile state exists at the critical intersection of insufficient political legitimacy and inadequate capacity to enforce laws and norms. These two fundamental elements of all functional states are required to maintain domestic stability. States can successfully maintain order with minimal coercive force if they possess high levels of political legitimacy that generate willing compliance, or conversely, they can maintain order with minimal legitimacy if they possess sufficient coercive capacity to credibly deter challenges to state authority.²⁰ Fragile states, however, possess inadequate quantities of both, rendering them acutely vulnerable to collapse into the kind of violence that triggers displacement when subjected to internal or external shocks.

The LSE-Oxford Commission on State Fragility, Growth and Development conceptualized this as the “fragility trap”—a self-perpetuating cycle wherein weak institutions cannot provide security or opportunity, leading to violence and displacement, which further undermines state capacity and legitimacy.²¹ Charles P. Martin-Shields’s theoretical framework identifies specific causal channels through which different dimensions of state fragility translate into displacement: administrative fragility creates conditions where populations cannot access essential needs; social fragility generates communal violence and persecution; and security fragility produces immediate physical threats that compel flight.²² It is estimated that by 2030, approximately half of the world’s extreme poor, roughly 900 million people, will reside in fragile states, with profound implications for displacement patterns.²³

Haiti and Venezuela exemplify divergent pathways through which state fragility generates forced displacement. Haiti demonstrates fragility manifested as territorial state absence and cascading institutional collapse. As of June 2025, nearly 1.3 million people are internally displaced within Haiti, with gang violence forcing 578,074 displacements during the first half of 2024 alone which is more than double the 2022 figure.²⁴ Haiti’s fragility has compounded progressively since the devastating 2010 earthquake that killed over 200,000 people, followed by a cholera outbreak and successive political crises that systematically eroded institutional capacity.²⁵ Gang violence has filled substantial power vacuums, with non-state armed groups controlling significant portions of territory and imposing their own governance while the state proves unable to reassert control. The result is primarily internal displacement as civilians flee between zones seeking relative safety, though shrinking secure geography increasingly compels some to seek international protection. Simultaneously, over 5.7 million people are experiencing acute food insecurity at the highest levels ever recorded.²⁶

Venezuela presents a qualitatively different manifestation: state predation and systematic institutional destruction generating primarily external displacement. Nearly 7.9 million Venezuelans have fled the country, currently the largest displacement crisis in the Western Hemisphere, as the government’s combination of severe economic mismanagement, political authoritarianism, and institutional destruction created acute shortages of food and medicine while hyperinflation rendered currency worthless.²⁷ The vast majority of displacement has occurred since 2015 as conditions deteriorated precipitously, transforming Venezuela from a relatively prosperous middle-income country into a major displacement-generating state within less than a decade.

The relationship between state fragility and displacement operates through interconnected causal mechanisms. Fragile states systematically lack capacity to protect civilians from security threats, whether from insurgencies, criminal organizations, or state repression which forces populations facing violence to flee when states cannot restore order.²⁸ They also demonstrate severely constrained capacity to respond to major shocks including natural disasters, economic crises, and disease outbreaks. As climate impacts intensify, fragile states will face compounding challenges straining already weak institutions and potentially triggering cascading failures. Breaking the fragility trap requires building legitimate institutions, strengthening state capacity, promoting inclusive economic development, and fostering social cohesion—processes requiring sustained international engagement over decades precisely when major donors are withdrawing support.²⁹

The Climate Crisis and Displacement

Climate change induced displacement is growing into an increasingly problematic driver of human flight that exposes critical gaps in the international legal framework. In 2024, extreme weather events led to the highest number of new displacements recorded since 2008, with 824,500 people displaced by 605 extreme weather events globally.³⁰ Since systematic reporting began, the number of climate-related displacements has grown year over year, with 359 million weather-related displacements recorded worldwide since 2008.³¹ The magnitude of the crisis is projected to intensify dramatically. While estimations of the number of climate induced displacements vary wildly from 25 million to 1.2 billion people by 2050 both numbers represent a scale that would fundamentally overwhelm existing humanitarian response capacities.³² By mid-2024, approximately 90 million of the current 123 million forcibly displaced people were already living in countries with high-to-extreme exposure to climate-related hazards representing an increase of some 5 million forcibly displaced people living in highly vulnerable areas since the end of 2023 alone.³³

Yet these climate-displaced populations remain unrecognized under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, which narrowly limits refugee status to those fleeing persecution on the basis of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.³⁴ People who are displaced by environmental factors, including rapid onset disasters such as floods, hurricanes, and wildfires, as well as slow-onset environmental degradation such as desertification, sea-level rise, and agricultural collapse, fall entirely outside the persecution-based definition that structures international refugee protection.³⁵ This legal gap leaves millions of people displaced by floods, droughts, hurricanes, and other climate-related disasters without adequate legal protections, pathways to safety, or durable solutions under international law.

The absence of a clear international legal framework to respond to climate-displaced populations has generated extensive scholarly debate and numerous policy proposals for reform. McAdam notes that proposals have ranged from creating a protocol to the existing Refugee Convention, developing a protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), or establishing a stand-alone treaty specifically designed to protect climate-displaced persons with defined legal status and resettlement solutions.³⁶ However, despite growing recognition of the protection gap and proliferating policy proposals, no binding international instrument has yet emerged to provide comprehensive legal protection for climate-displaced populations.

The current mandate of the UNHCR remains fundamentally unsuited to the challenges of the contemporary displacement era. The cumulative result of the UNHCR’s narrow persecution-based definition of refugees, the absence of a binding international convention to protect the 83 million people internally displaced within their own borders as of late 2024, and the glaring absence of clear, enforceable obligations for UN member nation-states to fulfill the human rights of displaced populations have each contributed substantially to the growing numbers of displaced persons and the increasingly protracted nature of displacement situations.³⁷ These systemic failures have created an international environment in which the human rights of refugees and displaced persons are routinely ignored, systematically violated, or left unimplemented despite formal legal commitments by states parties to relevant international instruments.

Where Do We Go From Here?

As the United Nations marks its 80th anniversary in 2025, this milestone presents a critical moment for reflection on the organization’s foundational purpose and its capacity to fulfill that mission in an era of unprecedented human displacement. In the first part of this two-part series we examine how the international refugee protection system, conceived in the aftermath of World War II, confronts challenges its architects could not have anticipated. The scale of state fragility as a primary displacement driver, unprecedented climate-induced migration, and ongoing conflict are overwhelming the limited resources to address these challenges. The UNHCR and related UN agencies remain indispensable, yet their capacity to fulfill their mandate has been systematically undermined by chronic underfunding, outdated legal frameworks, and the withdrawal of donor support precisely when need has reached historic levels.

The trajectory of displacement trends suggests conditions will deteriorate absent comprehensive reform and sustained international commitment. Projections indicate that climate change alone will displace 1.2 billion people by 2050, while approximately half of the world’s extreme poor, nearly 900 million people, may reside in fragile states by 2030, creating compounding displacement pressures.³⁸ The LSE-Oxford Commission warns that without addressing underlying state fragility through sustained development engagement, displacement crises will proliferate and intensify as fragile states face mounting pressures from conflict, economic instability, and climate impacts.³⁹ As McAdam observes, the absence of legal frameworks for climate displacement means millions will lack protection precisely as environmental threats intensify, creating a protection gap that will expand exponentially without urgent action.⁴⁰ The intersection of these trends, climate intensification, concentrated poverty in fragile states, inadequate legal protections, and declining international support, and the likelihood of new unforeseen threats to human life and wellbeing portend conditions for a humanitarian catastrophe that will dwarf current displacement levels.

The question is not whether reform is necessary, but whether the international community possesses the political will to implement it before the system collapses entirely under the weight of escalating need.

Part II of this analysis will examine how the current system fails displaced populations in practice, exploring the lived reality of refugees navigating inadequate protection frameworks, and will conclude with concrete recommendations for reform that match the scale and urgency of the crisis. The human rights implications of continued inaction extend beyond displacement itself to challenge the fundamental legitimacy of the post-World War II international order and its claims to protect human dignity in times of crisis.

Endnotes

¹ Ayana Archie, “A record 100 million people have been forced from their homes,” NPR, May 23, 2022, https://choice.npr.org/index.html?origin=https://www.npr.org/2022/05/23/1100655360/united-nations-world-displaced-new-record.

² UNHCR, “UNHCR: Ukraine, other conflicts push forcibly displaced total over 100 million for first time,” 2022, https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2022/5/628a389e4/unhcr-ukraine-other-conflicts-push-forcibly-displaced-total-100-million.html.

³ UNHCR, “Refugee Data Finder - Key Indicators,” accessed August 16, 2025, https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics.

⁴ Paul Collier and Alexander Betts, Refuge: Rethinking Refugee Policy in a Changing World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).

⁵ UNHCR, “UNHCR Steadfast in Refugee Protection as It Completes Review of Operations, Structures and Staffing,” June 16, 2025, https://www.unhcr.org/news/press-releases/unhcr-steadfast-refugee-protection-it-completes-review-operations-structures.

⁶ Onora O’Neill, “Agents of Justice,” in Global Responsibilities: Who Must Deliver on Human Rights?, ed. Andrew Kuper (New York: Routledge, 2014), 37-52.

⁷ Michael Freeman, Human Rights, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Polity, 2017).

⁸ Christopher McDowell and Gareth Morrell, Displacement Beyond Conflict: Challenges for the 21st Century (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010), 1.

⁹ Raquel Aldana, “The International Rights of Migrants,” in Handbook of Human Rights, ed. Thomas Cushman (New York: Routledge, 2013), 508-523.

¹⁰ Collier and Betts, Refuge.

¹¹ United Nations, “Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees,” The Audiovisual Library of International Law, 2008, https://legal.un.org/avl/ha/prsr/prsr.html.

¹² Walter Kälin, “The Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons,” Brookings, July 29, 2016, https://www.brookings.edu/on-the-record/the-human-rights-of-internally-displaced-persons-2/.

¹³ Collier and Betts, Refuge.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2024 (Geneva: UNHCR, June 2025), 978.

¹⁶ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Annual Results Report 2024: Myanmar (Geneva: UNHCR, May 28, 2025), https://www.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/2025-06/Myanmar%20ARR%202024.pdf.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ World Bank, Impacts of the Conflict in the Middle East on the Palestinian Economy (Washington, DC: World Bank, September 2024), https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/c25061ab26d14d7acc0330d5a7b4d496-0280012024/original/PalestinianEconomicUpdate-Sept2024-FINAL.pdf.

¹⁹ Collier and Betts, Refuge, 43-68.

²⁰ Paul Collier and Alexander Betts, “What Drives Displacement and Refuge?” OUPblog, September 2017, https://blog.oup.com/2017/09/what-drives-displacement-and-refuge.

²¹ LSE-Oxford Commission on State Fragility, Growth and Development, Escaping the Fragility Trap (London: International Growth Centre, 2018), 1-15, https://www.theigc.org/publications/escaping-fragility-trap.

²² Charles P. Martin-Shields, “State Fragility as a Cause of Forced Displacement: Identifying Theoretical Channels for Empirical Research,” Discussion Paper 30/2017 (Bonn: German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik, 2017), 8-12.

²³ LSE-Oxford Commission, Escaping the Fragility Trap, 5-7.

²⁴ International Organization for Migration, “Haiti Sees Record Displacement as 1.3 Million Flee Violence,” 2025, https://www.iom.int/news/haiti-sees-record-displacement-13-million-flee-violence.

²⁵ UNHCR, “Haiti: A Multi-dimensional Crisis Leading to Continued Displacement,” October 2024, https://dataviz.unhcr.org/product-gallery/2024/10/haiti-a-multi-dimensional-crisis-leading-to-continued-displacement/.

²⁶ International Organization for Migration Displacement Tracking Matrix, “Haiti,” 2024, https://dtm.iom.int/haiti.

²⁷ UNHCR, “Venezuela Situation,” 2024, https://www.unhcr.org/emergencies/venezuela-situation.

²⁸ Martin-Shields, “State Fragility as a Cause of Forced Displacement,” 24-27.

²⁹ LSE-Oxford Commission, Escaping the Fragility Trap, 89-112.

³⁰ Earth.org, “2024 Saw Highest New Climate-Related Displacements Since 2008,” March 20, 2025, https://earth.org/extreme-weather-events-in-2024-led-to-highest-number-of-new-displacements-since-2008/.

³¹ Al Jazeera, “Mapping the Impact of Climate Change on Global Displacement,” November 22, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/11/22/mapping-the-impact-of-climate-change-on-global-displacement.

³² Shombi Sharp, “A Global Migration Framework Under Water: How Can the International Community Protect Climate Refugees?” Chicago Journal of International Law 21, no. 2 (2021): 387-422.

³³ UN Refugee Agency, “How Climate Change Impacts Refugees and Displaced Communities,” accessed October 3, 2025, https://www.unrefugees.org/news/how-climate-change-impacts-refugees-and-displaced-communities/.

³⁴ United Nations, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137, Article 1(A)(2).

³⁵ Jane McAdam, Climate Change, Forced Migration, and International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 37-73.

³⁶ Ibid., 248-275.

³⁷ International Organization for Migration, “IDMC Report: Record 83 Million People Living in Internal Displacement Worldwide,” May 13, 2025, https://www.iom.int/news/idmc-report-record-83-million-people-living-internal-displacement-worldwide.

³⁸ Sharp, “A Global Migration Framework Under Water,” 387-422; LSE-Oxford Commission, Escaping the Fragility Trap, 5-7.

³⁹ LSE-Oxford Commission, Escaping the Fragility Trap, 113-128.

⁴⁰ McAdam, Climate Change, Forced Migration, and International Law, 248-275.